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Dewey’s Pragmatism and the Great Community 
Philip Schuyler Bishop 
Abstract 
 
In investigating Dewey’s theory of the Great community, it is important to 
first examine closely Dewey’s theory of scientific inquiry and show how it evades 
the spectator theory of knowledge common to all modern epistemologies as 
closed systems. Dewey maintained that through controlled experimentalism we 
engage, and can solve, existential issues facing us for the purpose of expanding 
human freedom, promoting the democratic way of life and cultivating the 
institutions which foster these activities. The usage of inquiry to overcome 
problematic situations therefore stands as one of the first conditions needed to 
attain the great community. 
Since Dewey did not view human beings as isolated and passive 
spectators he engaged in formulating what it means to become an individual with 
experimental habits. Dewey envisioned humans as organisms operating in a 
common cultural environment rather than private entities cut off from one 
another. We are communal by way of communication. The next condition 
required to bring about the great community is open communication. 
 iv 
Dewey held that human beings need to operate through the development 
of such habits that assist them in overcoming obstacles by means of an 
education that secures the process of cultural growth. This aspect of his theory 
became the backbone of Dewey’s conception of ethical value and his political 
theory. Members of the Great community must trust and freely associate to 
accomplish the social growth that Dewey advocates therefore free association is 
another condition for the achievability of the great community. 
As I argue, for Dewey, any way of life which is oriented toward individual 
growth can be democratic. A democratic way of life is shown to be superior to 
any other currently pursued. Thus, any community which cultivates democratic 
practices throughout its culture can become a participant in the great community. 
By so doing it allows the individuals of that community to flourish as ethical and 
cognitive agents. Therefore democracy as a way of life requires that individuals 
participate within the cultivation of themselves and their community and this is 
the next condition for achieving the great community. 
The final condition for achieving the great community is the full integration 
and usage of individual’s potentialities. If these six conditions are met, Dewey 
held the conditions would be ripe to bring about a great community. He never 
completed the social task of what the great community would be once attained, 
but this dissertation will gather together the materials he did provide on it and 
trace the steps that would be needed to achieve it. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation is a work designed to draw together various strands of 
thought from throughout the work of the American philosopher, John Dewey 
(October 20, 1859 – June 1, 1952) and bring them together into a comprehensive 
whole with a special focus on Dewey’s theory of the great community. While 
Dewey repeatedly claimed not to have a closed system, I aim to show, by way of 
overlap and interplay of intellectual currents, the deep interconnectedness of 
Dewey’s thinking in an open-ended system. 
Dewey only mentions the great community in two places in his corpus: the 
first is in the middle chapters of The Public and its Problems and the second is in 
his absentee address to the Conference on Education and Philosophy, University 
of Illinois, 21 October 1949. In this second citation, a clue is found as to where 
the idea for the great community originated: 
There is the realization, peculiarly precious at a time of 
stress and strain such as we live in today, that we all are 
links in an ever-continuing and out-reaching chain of 
intellectual and moral continuity. In it each of us is able to 
give to those who follow because of what we have already 
received from others. Even in the most trying days there is 
ground for hope, and more than hope, for confidence, in this 
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fact, to which Josiah Royce years ago gave the name “The 
great community,” and which it is an acute satisfaction to 
know it also The Continuing Community.1 
The Work by Josiah Royce that Dewey mentioned was titled The Hope for the 
Great Community and was published before the close of the First World War in 
November of 1916. In it Royce places his finger upon the pulse of the issue upon 
which this dissertation will expand: 
Some motives which tend to render the genuine Pauline 
charity, the genuine love of the unity of the great community 
to which all civilized men may, when enlightened, 
consciously belong, - such motives, I say, have been 
furthered by the arts, the industries, the sciences and the 
social developments of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, as thousands of years of previous human activity 
have never furthered them.2 
Royce clearly believed that the advancement of human understanding and 
association had made possible a society based upon cooperation and civilization. 
Importantly, Royce was also an idealist and his vision of the great community 
had more to do with finding the ideal good here on Earth as typified by the 
statement that “every idealist believes himself to have rational grounds for the 
                                                 
1 Introduction to Essays for John Dewey’s Ninetieth Birthday, ed. Kenneth Dean benne 
and William Oliver Stanley (Urbana, Ill.; Bureau of Research and Service, College of Education, 
University of Illinois, 1950) pp. 3-4, from statement read for Dewey at the Conference on 
Education and Philosophy, University of Illinois, 21 October 1949. 
 
2 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 38. 
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faith that somewhere, and in some world, and at some time, the ideal will 
triumph, so that a survey, a divine synopsis of all time, somehow reveals the 
lesson of all sorrow, the meaning of all tragedy, the triumph of the spirit.”3 
Royce was not so blinded by his idealism to see that there were forces 
operating against this fashion, which he compared to the host of Satan’s fallen 
angels in their opposition to God’s message. He saw the great community as the 
culmination of Adam’s struggle against the influence of Satan, and the great 
community is in effect an evolved “Zion” of the Christian church whereby “this 
triumph of humanity, this hope of all the faithful, this salvation of a community 
through an universally significant human transformation, without which no 
salvation of an individual man would be possible, this idea, in terms of which the 
Apostle Paul universalized the ideal Jerusalem of the early Prophets, this 
became the most essential and characteristic idea of the Christian Church.”4 
Royce realized that this Heaven on Earth would require some of the forces 
which were only recently available to humanity, such as “the growth of the natural 
sciences as well as of the technical industries of mankind,”5 but he also realized 
there were blockages to accomplishing Zion coming from such quarters as 
“confusions of men’s tongues, by the mutual hostility of nations, of religions, and 
of sects, and by the absence of means whereby men might learn to work 
together.”6 While it may appear odd to see a self-avowed idealist speak of 
                                                 
3 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 27. 
 
4 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 35. 
 
5 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 38. 
 
6 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 41. 
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material means to accomplishing a spiritual community, he held the likeliest 
means to be the humane arts and the burgeoning sciences. 
He also stated that the ideal required humans to “not be merely individual 
human beings, not yet mere collections or masses of human beings, however 
vast, but communities of some sort, communities such as, at any stage of 
civilization in which the great community is to be raised to some higher level of 
organization, already exist.”7 Additionally, membership within the great 
community required “loyalty, the devotion of the self to the interests of the 
community,” for “without loyalty, there is no salvation.”8 Yet another issue to be 
overcome is the “detached individual” for whom enforcement of the law brings 
about a “war going on in his own members”9 for he, in seeking individual 
pleasure, as well as in being a social-being and in feeling restrained by the social 
order, is at war with himself. Therefore “for the detached individual there is no 
salvation.”10 In contradistinction to this he states “what saves us on any level of 
human social life is union,”11 and he meant by this a conscious unity in a 
community which the individual members do not feel forced to partake in it, but 
rather willingly and knowingly are devoted. 
A final characteristic which Royce held would be required to bring about 
the ideal community would be that it be made up of nations, distinct from one 
                                                 
7 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 43. 
 
8 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 45. 
 
9 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 47. 
 
10 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 48. 
 
11 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 52. 
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another. Political unity would not be the basis of a great community, since “there 
seems to be some opposition between the political power of a nation and its 
power to contribute to the ideals of the community of mankind.”12 Royce believed 
there must be a diversity of nations and races because political unity had the 
opposite effect upon humane community; in unifying a nation politically, its 
people are splintered like never before. Therefore “if the ideal is approximately 
realized, the kingdom will be in this world, yet its servants will not fight, simply 
because they will be loyally engrossed in much better business than fighting.”13 
Oddly, Royce felt the invention of the form of business of insurance proves a 
Pauline charity is evolving, because “the business of insurance depends upon 
devices which are, so to speak, essentially unifying, essentially reconciling, 
essentially such as to exemplify a type of social community,”14 thereby proving 
that business could be conducted in such a way as to bring humanity together. I 
am sure Royce would be saddened by the contemporary practice of insurance 
which operates more to maximize profits at the expense of individuals, than to 
unify communities.15 
It is clear from this discussion of the origin of the theory of the great 
community that Dewey drew from Royce’s conception. However, Dewey had also 
                                                 
12 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 57. 
 
13 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 58.  
 
14 Royce, Josiah. The Hope of the Great Community p. 62 
 
15 His recommendation to form an international insurance body is likely to meet with 
similar motivation issues of contemporary insurance companies; I will henceforth avoid further 
mention of his recommendations in this venture even though they relate as the means he 
recommended toward reconciling international war and forming a unity of interests.  I view his 
primary recommendation, the formation of an international insurance board, to be far less 
valuable than what he laid  
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rejected idealism and Christianity by the time he began utilizing this theory, so he 
was forced to recast it in a naturalists’ mold. It is Dewey’s naturalistic 
reconstruction of the theory of the great community which my dissertation will 
undertake to discuss and criticize. 
That Dewey insisted upon utilizing the most careful and qualified scientific 
inquiries to guide our cultural, moral and even philosophic endeavors will be 
taken as a central tenet and will make up the thrust of the second chapter. 
Exploration will begin by noting Dewey’s biting criticism of what he called the 
“spectator theory of knowing” which he believed most Western philosophers 
previous to him had suffered under. In place of a passive spectator, Dewey 
recommended an engaged and active experimental approach to formulating 
knowing. He held that by way of experimental inquiry it was possible to arrive at 
solutions for problematic situations that humans faced. This premise will be the 
back-bone upon which this dissertation proceeds and uses as a methodology for 
future chapters. By starting with a method for investigating problems and tackling 
them, progress can be made on the issues that follow. While this chapter 
appears on its face to be the least connected with the great community, it in fact 
forms the foundation upon which all other conditions rest. The ability to utilize 
scientific inquiry to overcome problematic situations stands as the first condition 
for the possibility of bringing about the great community. 
One of the political doctrines Dewey was most critical of, and which he 
believed was a by-product of adhering to a spectator theory of knowing, was the 
theory of human nature and political doctrine known as individualism. A 
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discussion of Dewey’s criticism will constitute the third chapter of my dissertation. 
Where previous thinkers had posited the individual as a ready-made and fully 
formed entity, Dewey criticized this belief as unfounded and dangerously 
dogmatic. During Dewey’s time at Columbia University he had worked closely 
with, and been influenced by, the anthropological research of Franz Boas. This 
research contributed to Dewey’s belief in the overwhelming effect of culture upon 
the formation of independent human organisms and that radical individualism 
was a cultural development of the widespread influence of personal salvation 
from the dominant religion of the West, Christianity, and the Western European 
philosophic tradition rather than some inherent aspect of human nature. The 
primary evidence Dewey utilized in his rejection of radical individualism is the 
dependence of human beings upon one another for basic survival. He further 
rejected radical individualism by exploring the communal nature of cultural 
practice (i.e. a rejection of private culture) and by indicating the massively 
communal nature of most current institutions, ranging from universal education to 
corporate business and team sports. Few aspects of contemporary life are 
anything like rugged individualism. By establishing the dependence of humans 
upon one another, the second condition for achieving the great community will be 
discussed. 
The fourth chapter will further explore human nature, experience, habits, 
and culture, where habits are taken to be the latticework of culture. By exploring 
how individuals are the locus of activity in experience, how experience is 
tempered by habits and how culture is an organic unity of habits and structuring 
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human nature, a base-line will have been reached by which it will be shown that 
the malleable aspect of individuals is their habits. By establishing the pivot point 
for change, habits will be the means by which a reconstruction of human conduct 
based upon scientific inquiry and aimed at the highest freedom through free 
association and sustainable habits is another condition for the formation of the 
great community. 
Due to the importance of habits in social organization, a further exploration 
of habit formation, habit activation, the role of impulse in habit activation and the 
process of habit reconstruction is necessary. In this exploration Dewey’s 
differentiation of impulses from impulsions will be explored in relationship to habit 
activation. Following this I will explore the consequences of Dewey’s theory of 
habit formation and operation. One of the pitfalls to be avoided with any habit, or 
behavior is routine and stagnation of habits, especially in activities which are 
harmful. To complete this chapter I explore the utilization of experimental inquiry 
in habit reconstruction and show how habit formation and reconstruction 
constitute educational practices. Having established habit reconstruction toward 
inquiry as the primary purpose of education, the institute by which habit 
reconstruction is possible is established and one means by which the great 
community can be formed is established. 
By combining Dewey’s theory of habit, culture and inquiry we arrive at one 
of Dewey’s seminal conclusions: the dependence of individuals upon cultural 
institutions for the cultivation of their own growth potential. In the fifth chapter I 
will first investigate that Dewey held humans could cultivate themselves by way 
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of cultural institutions, such as education, to grow and secondly how it was that 
we utilize inquiry to steer and reconstruct this process. Growth without steady 
and controlled inquiry would be blind groping or steadfast adherence to dogma; 
neither of which Dewey believed were helpful, in the long-run, to the 
development of human potential. Dewey deemed that controlled inquiry and the 
education of humans to better utilize inquiry in all walks of human life was the 
path toward individual and cultural growth while maintaining harmony with the 
environment. This path interpenetrated the individual with the institutions of 
society thus demonstrating the need that individuals had for a community 
oriented toward individual growth and how communities of this sort can only arise 
by way of educational institutions. Therefore a reformed education institution 
constitutes a central pre-condition for the formation of any sustainable community 
in general, but also for the great community in particular. 
Dewey maintained that a culture oriented toward harmonious growth 
would be a democratic-way-of-life. He spoke of democracy as a way of life as 
distinct from a governmental practice of elections, but also suggested that a 
democratic political environment fostered a democratic way of life. This will be 
the focus of my sixth chapter. However, Dewey did not believe democracy was a 
shield or umbrella under which we could retreat to protect us from the ills of the 
world. Rather, he believed democracy-as-a-way-of-life was something to be 
worked toward and fostered. By working toward reconstructing cultural 
institutions to better assist humans in attaining continued personal growth, 
Dewey held that both community and individual were improved. However, this 
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way of life does not spring like an oasis ready-made in the desert; rather, 
democracy must be fostered by restructuring educational practices to better 
incorporate ways of thinking and acting which are democratic in nature. 
Democracy as a way of life stands as a requirement that all citizens fully 
participate to their fullest potential and this is the next condition for the 
establishment of the great community. 
The great community was an ideal which Dewey believed would be 
neither a fascistic militarization nor a communistic homogenization of culture, but 
would nevertheless be unified around common understandings publicly available, 
and engaged by an active and educated public. In some ways he likened this 
community to the scientific community insofar as it has the unified objective of 
furthering scientific understanding regardless of its’ members individual 
objectives. In the final chapter I explore how this “public” could embrace 
democracy-as-a-way-of-life so thoroughly that it would infuse the very fabric of 
education, politics and community life and in turn lead to fullness and cultivation 
of true individuals. In this sense Dewey believed individualism was a goal to be 
achieved and only when conditions were right. Some of the conditions needed to 
obtain this cultural accomplishment were a) equilibrium brought about by way of 
intelligent problem solving, b) harmonious existence with environmental 
conditions allowing for sustainable living and c) unique human organisms living 
together in concert through a democratic community oriented toward the 
cultivation of individual growth, thus contributing to the possibility of the great 
community. 
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While I am interested in rigorous scholastic investigation into Dewey’s 
thought, it is only for the hope of uncovering applicable, useful and practical 
instruments for resolving problematic situations currently being faced to better lay 
the ground for the possibility of the great community. 
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Chapter Two: The Problem of Knowledge 
This chapter will draw heavily from the following works by Dewey: The 
Public and its Problems, Democracy and Education, How We Think, 
Reconstruction in Philosophy but primarily from A Quest for Certainty and Logic: 
The Theory of Inquiry. 
Epistemology, as the theory of knowledge, has been the central emphasis 
of philosophic investigation for the past three and a half centuries. While schools 
of thought have risen and fallen in this time, no definitive resolution to the 
epistemic problem of bridging the gap between mind and world as proposed by 
Descartes has been evident. During his early days in philosophy, Dewey had 
originally moved closer to Hegelian idealism, very much in line with the Cartesian 
project. After being exposed to James’ psychology and returning to the pragmatic 
tendencies of his former logic professor, Charles S. Peirce, Dewey decided that 
rather than tackling the mind-body interaction problem head-on he would instead 
approach it from a radically different perspective. Rather than seeking root 
causes to explain the world about him, Dewey embraced pragmatism and turned 
toward observable consequences. Approached from this perspective, Dewey 
viewed the epistemic problem to be a pseudo-problem and moved away from 
models of knowing based upon passivity toward those models which were active 
in character. This shift allowed Dewey to criticize the epistemological issue and 
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release the energies of philosophic thought to engage more pressing societal 
and cultural needs. 
By accepting the model of scientific investigation, whereby theories are 
accepted hypothetically and then tested experimentally, he proposed a theory of 
inquiry. This theory of inquiry, being itself accepted hypothetically tested by the 
results of its utilization, is not a claim at verisimilitude or objectivity, but is instead 
a philosophic method for approaching problematic situations faced by humanity 
that offers postulations for reconciling these problems. Rather than seeking 
timeless and absolute truth, Dewey sought for the answers to concrete problems 
faced by humans; answers to these problems come in the form of resolving the 
problem and possibly future problems of a similar form. An additional aspect of 
Dewey’s theory is that the object, in being inquired into, is changed through the 
very process of inquiry. It is perhaps this aspect which marks the greatest 
divergence between Dewey’s own theories and those of the dualistic 
philosophers. 
From Absolutism to Pragmatism 
 Dewey’s original channel of philosophic thought was idealistic in tenor. 
While there lurked an emphasis upon nature and organic perspectives, these 
perspectives lay largely unplumbed.16 His psychological and logical sojourns 
were heavily colored by the dominant epistemic tradition of his day and he 
therefore accepted as a baseline a heritage which approached the problem of 
knowledge by seeking out root causes. A consequence of this idealistic thinking 
                                                 
16 It is important to note for future chapters that much of Dewey’s educational work was 
completed during his idealistic phase and is therefore colored accordingly. This will become 
pertinent in later chapters. 
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was its totalizing and absolutist approach, indicative of Dewey’s Hegelian leaning 
during these early years. But even in Dewey’s early years, he had become 
critical of the speculative project of absolute self-consciousness. The methods by 
which post-Kantians sought to investigate the absolute suffered from the same 
fallacious thinking the idealists accused the empiricists of, and Dewey was aware 
of this failing: if the parts of an entity (in this case absolute self-consciousness) 
are unobservable, then the whole of the entity “I” is likewise unobservable.17 
Dewey attempted to move away from this problem, while remaining within the 
idealistic tradition, by moving toward what he called experimental idealism. This 
transition was half-hearted at best and finally culminated in his rejection of the 
idealistic project in favor of pragmatism. 
 The movement away from an idealistic perspective toward a pragmatic 
one is of central importance regarding Dewey’s theory of the great community. 
Idealistic philosophies, especially those of absolutist stripes, are ultimately 
trapped in solipsism and unable to escape an epistemic prison. Heirs to 
Descartes’ philosophic systems, even post-Kantian, ultimately had the issue of 
connecting mind with world. If mind were absolute and ideal, in what way could it 
transact with a material world of change and flux? While this problem can be 
traced back to pre-Socratic origins, the issue nevertheless persisted. If a theory 
is trapped in solipsistic navel-gazing, how could community be possible? 
Admittance of the existence of an external world is problem enough for this sort 
                                                 
17 Welchman, Jennifer. “From Absolute Idealism to Instrumentalism: The Problem of 
Dewey’s early Philosophy” Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society, 1989, Vol. 25, 
Number 4, p. 414. 
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of project, much less the admittance of other minds and one’s connection to 
them. 
 As Dewey slowly drew away from idealistic and absolutist thinking, and 
toward pragmatic and instrumentalist thinking, he left behind the problems of the 
existence of an external world and the problem of other minds. In their place, he 
sought to observe the consequences of theories and actions and utilized this as 
the foundation for a theory. By the time Dewey rejected absolutism he had 
abandoned “the search for causes and forces and turn[ed] to the analysis of what 
is going on and how it goes on.”18 What this process entailed for Dewey was first 
accepting Bradley’s theory that all propositional judgments are hypothetical and 
suppositional and therefore are in effect an “ideal experiment.”19 
 With the publication of Studies in Logical Theory in 1903, Dewey had 
largely moved toward accepting a thin pragmatism, or at least a radical 
empiricism. This is largely attributed to the effect of James’ Psychology upon the 
young Dewey, but an even earlier influence by Charles S. Peirce cannot be 
ignored. What radical empiricism and pragmatism meant to the early Dewey was 
a rejection of a priori necessity and an acceptance of experimental methodology 
for understanding what constitutes the ”real.” Dewey’s pragmatic turn had begun 
and he re-assessed virtually every area of philosophy. Perhaps the most 
important shift was away from epistemological foundations and toward 
methodology when he stated that “philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be 
                                                 
18 Dewey, John. The Public and its Problems p. 21. 
 
19 Bradley, F. H. Principles of Logic p. 86. Whether this was proto-pragmatism or not, I’ll 
leave to debate another day; nevertheless it was movement away from absolutism. 
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a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, 
cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.”20 Rather than 
continually returning to intractable debates regarding philosophic contents, 
Dewey hoped to utilize the rigor and tenacity of philosophers to tackle existent 
social and cultural problems faced by individuals outside of the profession of 
philosophy. Rather than idly questing for philosophic certainty, Dewey held that 
overcoming problems by way of scientific inquiry sufficed. Peirce had previously 
stated that "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our 
hearts," and Dewey would have agreed wholeheartedly that certainty is 
unnecessary when the problem ceases to be of importance.21 
All we know about a thing called cause or antecedent is what 
comes after. We would not be able to make an intelligent 
statement about it. It is only by seeing and knowing its 
consequences that we can get any meaning from it as a 
cause.22 
By looking toward consequences, as found in observation, rather than seeking 
hidden causes and forces, Dewey had taken his own Copernican Turn; now 
idealism would be the theory lurking in the wings rather than naturalism and 
organic psychology. 
                                                 
20 Dewey, John. “The Need for Recovery in Philosophy” 1917.  
 
21 Peirce, Charles S. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy (1868) 2, 140-157. 
 
22 Dewey, John. “The Historical Method in Ethics” The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo 
Ann Boydston, Volume 17, p. 359. 
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 While this move appears innocuous, it took Dewey the remainder of his 
career to work out the entailments of seeking consequences rather than 
causes.23 He had moved away from Peirce’s strand of pragmatism which focused 
exhaustively on the meaning of hard words. Dewey had also moved away from 
James’ pragmatism which focused too narrowly on the success or failure of 
actions. Although James was originally enthusiastic about Dewey’s work, and 
while Dewey appeared to be enthralled by James’ approach during his middle 
period, eventually both James’ and Peirce’s influence ended with their deaths. 
Not long after their deaths, Dewey renounced the moniker of pragmatism and 
replaced it with instrumentalism. While he had taken Peirce’s lead in changing 
the name of his brand of philosophy, the content did not radically shift in this 
period. By utilizing empirical observations and seeking consequences within 
those observations, Dewey was forced to reject much of what had come to him 
by way of the tradition of philosophy. First among those rejections was the 
spectator theory of knowledge. 
The Spectator Theory of Knowledge 
Many traditional theories of knowing, especially the dualistic theories of 
the Modern period, have at their root the problem of how to overcome the gap 
between mind and world. This problem stems from the hypotheses inherent in 
dualistic approaches to knowing insofar as a knowing subject is assumed to be a 
private and passive spectator of nature. Dewey rejected both of these premises 
                                                 
23 Seeking consequences in order to understand an object or concept should not be 
confused with utilitarianism which gauges the success or failure of an action based upon whether 
it brought pain or pleasure to the largest number of individuals. While similar in tenor, the 
differences are enormous. Pragmatism is a theory of meaning while utilitarianism is a theory of 
psychology and human nature. 
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when he stated that “Mind has not remained a passive spectator of the universe, 
but has produced and is producing certain results.”24 Instead he held the 
assumption that the process of knowing, which he called inquiry, was inherently a 
public and an active affair. A theory of knowing which begins with these 
assumptions has no epistemic gap to overcome and instead the issues of 
knowing are practically problematic (albeit fallible) rather than theoretically 
insurmountable. In order to arrive at these root assumptions Dewey had to reject 
the modern interpretation of knowing and he began this rejection by criticizing 
what he called the spectator theory of knowledge. 
The modern tradition’s theories of knowledge are largely the result of 
Descartes’ philosophic investigations on this subject and to his lasting influence 
on the modern period. His most lasting influence was, in part, the problem he left 
behind, as Dewey stated: 
Descartes performed his task of separation. Yet the 
introduction of the Deus ex machina only complicated the 
problem; it introduced a third factor where two were already 
too many. What is the relation of God to Mind and to 
Matter?”25 
Cartesian epistemology starts from a position analogous to the act of seeing, 
whereby the passive eye receives an image of the object; likewise the passive 
                                                 
24 Dewey, John. The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Volume 2: 1887, 
Psychology, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, EW 2.16. 
 
25 Dewey, John. The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Volume 1: 1882-1888, 
Essays, Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, EW 
1.287. 
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mind receives perceptions of the object of knowledge. Descartes stated “I term 
that clear which is present and apparent to the attentive mind, in the same way 
as we assert that we see objects clearly, when being present to the regarding 
eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength.”26 The analogy between 
knowing and seeing is straight-forward. He makes the case again in his Rules for 
the Direction of the Mind where he states the case even more clearly by saying 
“truly we shall learn to employ our mental intuition from comparing it with the way 
in which we employ our eyes.”27 It is evident from these passages that Descartes 
held the act of apprehension to be analogous to the act of seeing. Said 
differently, Descartes held apprehension to be a largely passive affair of 
spectating. An important caveat is that Descartes referred to the “attentive” mind, 
but since attention is left unplumbed in these passages by Descartes, this caveat 
does little to save Descartes from the accusation of holding a spectator theory of 
knowledge. 
But rationalists were not alone in holding this epistemology, as the British 
empiricists were guilty as well. Locke informs us that “the mind clearly and 
infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is, and all 
distinct ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other; and this it does without 
pains, labour, or deduction, but at first view, by its natural power of perception 
                                                 
26 Descartes, Renee. Principles of Philosophy, HR 1, p. 237, part I, #XLV. 
 
27 Descartes, Renee. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, HR 1, p. 28 (Rule IX). Italics 
mine. 
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and distinction.”28 The mind’s power to grasp ideas is likened with the power of 
visual distinction and perception. A clear similarity between the act of viewing 
and the mental act of apprehension is made 
Locke is not the only empiricist to make such claims, as Hume does so as 
well. In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume describes the relations between 
objects of knowledge and certainty whereby “three of these relations are 
discoverable at first sight … when any objects resemble each other, the 
resemblance will at first strike the eye, or rather the mind.”29 No subtlety is 
attempted to disguise the overt connection between the act of seeing and the act 
of knowing for Hume. So straight-forward is the comparison that the act of 
recognition in seeing is directly comparable to the recognition of resemblance by 
the mind. Passivity and receptivity are the means by which minds come to know 
for Hume. 
But rather than starting from the modern perspective which holds some 
private and passive knowing subject above the world, and instead of holding the 
act of knowing to be an act of apprehension analogous to the act of seeing, 
Dewey began from a Darwinian and biological perspective which held humans to 
be animals in a world and knowing to be a mode of operation of that animal. He 
stated: 
[The] doctrine of organic development means that the living 
creature is a part of the world, sharing its vicissitudes and 
                                                 
28 Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. 1, (“Of 
Knowledge in General”) p. 169. Italics added. 
29 Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part III, Section 1: “Of Knowledge”, 
p. 70. Italics mine. 
 21 
fortunes, and making itself secure in its precarious 
dependence only as it intellectually identifies itself with the 
things about it, and, forecasting the future consequences of 
what is going on, [and] shapes its own activities accordingly. 
If the living, experiencing being is an intimate participant in 
the activities of the world to which it belongs, then 
knowledge is a mode of participation, valuable in the degree 
in which it is effective. It cannot be the idle view of an 
unconcerned spectator.30 
Here Dewey states a direct connection between biology and knowing: knowing is 
an activity that certain biological entities perform in order to better shape their 
environment, or adapt themselves to living within it. By starting with biological 
organisms as the central emphasis, rather than minds or subjects, the pervasive 
problem of how it is that a mind ever comes to know an external world ceases to 
be of central epistemic importance. Rather than assuming the act of knowing is 
analogous to the act of seeing and then being baffled how it is that any of 
knowing could ever possibly be about the world, Dewey rejects the act of seeing 
as the analogy for knowing. Instead the act of knowing is the active manipulation 
of existential material and knowing is an activity which has public effects capable 
of being replicated and falsified by others. To the degree that it accomplishes the 
stated goals a thing is known. Instead of being based upon the analogy of 
seeing, the importance is placed upon how best can an organism adapt or shape 
                                                 
30 Dewey, John. Democracy and Education, MW 9.347. 
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its surrounding conditions (or itself) to act intelligently; it is just this shift that is 
characteristic of Dewey’s divergence with dualistic thought. 
Therefore Dewey saw both rationalists and empiricists as maintaining an 
equivalent theory of knowledge which he later called the spectator theory of 
knowledge: 
The theory of knowing is modeled after what was supposed 
to take place in the act of vision. The object refracts light to 
the eye and is seen; it makes a difference to the eye and to 
the person having an optical apparatus, but none to the thing 
seen. The real object is the object so fixed in its regal 
aloofness that it is a king to any beholding mind that may 
gaze upon it. A spectator theory of knowledge is the 
inevitable outcome.31 
It is important to realize for purposes of understanding Dewey’s criticism that 
while these different traditions utilized vastly divergent vocabularies to describe 
their epistemic grounding, nevertheless their models were the same: passive 
reception. 
Dewey’s rejection of the spectator theory of knowledge was due in part to 
the fact that he viewed the “problem of knowledge” as insoluble by use of the 
assumptions of the modern period alone: 
All of the rivalries and connected problems [of epistemology] 
spring from a single root. They spring from the assumption 
                                                 
31 Dewey, John. The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 4: 1929, The 
Quest for Certainty ed. Jo Ann Boydston, LW 4.19 
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that the true and valid object of knowledge is that which has 
being prior to and independent of the operations of knowing 
… once we see that knowledge is not the act of an outside 
spectator but of a participator inside the natural and social 
scene, then the true object of knowledge resides in the 
consequences of directed action.32 
One of the chief difficulties with prior theories of knowledge was their reliance 
upon a belief that a knowing mind mirrors a perfect and unchanging nature in the 
act of knowing. Said differently, the knowing mind “sees” reality and knowledge is 
a reflection of the thing known. Taken one step further, the object of knowledge is 
in no way changed by the act of knowing within a spectator theory; the object 
must remain stable for a correspondence between the mind and the world to 
exist at all. But Dewey believed this concept of knowledge differed markedly from 
actual cases where we come to know “things” insofar as we experiment and 
manipulate things when we strive to understand them. The act of manipulation 
and experimentation inevitably changes the “thing” as we come to know it. We 
shake, rotate, scrape, heat, cool and shatter things as we attempt to understand 
them. It is through the process of actively manipulating things that Dewey 
believed we came to know them. Dewey stated that 
If the living, experiencing being is an intimate participant in 
the activities of the world to which it belongs, then 
knowledge is a mode of participation, valuable in the degree 
                                                 
32 Dewey, John. The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 4: 1929, The 
Quest for Certainty, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, LW 4.196. 
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in which it is effective. It cannot be the idle view of an 
unconcerned spectator.33 
As animals in an environment, in order to continue living, we must strive to 
maintain equilibrium and balance. This balance and equilibrium means we 
manipulate our environment: we push and pull at the factors around us to better 
suit ourselves. Rather than sitting idly by, Dewey held that knowers are involved 
in their environment as much as their environment is involved in them. In this way 
we are not idle spectators but active participants. 
Dewey’s rejection of the spectator theory of knowing is therefore a 
rejection of a model of science which is concerned with detailing the way the 
world “is” and instead focuses on the way things act: 
The spectator theory of knowledge, which Dewey 
uncompromisingly rejected, is so pervasive that it is hard not 
to think in its terms. By this theory, science is thought of as 
establishing once and for all (by some esoteric and virtually 
infallible method) what is. For Dewey this is erroneous: 
science proposes hypotheses which tell us what we can 
expect to happen under specific circumstances when these 
hypotheses result from a self-consciously experimental 
outlook which distinguishes science from other activities. 
Scientists specifically select data—which are not “given” but 
taken—and explicitly define the specialized terms for the 
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functional purpose of conducting controlled experiments. 
More importantly, science tries to tell us why things happen 
the way they do.34 
While it is easy to confuse “why things happen the way they do” with 
“establishing once and for all what is” the two are quite different. In the first case 
this is a description of consequences, behaviors and actions, all available to 
public scrutiny. In the second case it is an appeal to a priori and ontological 
descriptions available only to the mystics with their totalized visions of the way 
“things are.” The first path, the path of action and consequence, is open and 
available and is the path recommended by Dewey; the second path, which is 
passive and private, is the path of insoluble epistemic lock-jaw. 
Experimentalism is Active Engagement 
Dewey’s theory of knowing was based upon a faith in the experimental 
methods of the scientific method.35 He believed that science had proven, in a 
rather spectacular manner, the success of its methods in knowing the world 
around it.36 Rather than being paralyzed by philosophic angst over whether 
knowing is possible at all, the experimental method is an active participant in the 
world; Dewey’s response is the rejection of the spectator theory of knowledge. 
Scientific method replaces the repeated conjunction or 
coincidence of separate facts by discovery of a single 
                                                 
34 Webb, James L. “Dewey: Back to the Future” Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 36, 
2002. 
 
35 This faith should not be confused for a faith “in the absence of evidence” but rather a 
faith in the face of evidence. In this way this “faith” differs markedly from that of religious faith. 
 
36 An important caveat is that “knowing” is a technical term for Dewey which involves 
changing and directing more than getting at what it is “in itself.” 
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comprehensive fact, effecting the replacement by breaking 
up the coarse or gross facts of observation in a number of 
minuter processes not directly accessible to perception.37 
Dewey held the scientific method as superior to a merely empirical method due 
to its ability to actively investigate rather than relying upon passive observation.38 
By breaking the observation into smaller observations and tracking their overlap, 
Dewey believed the scientific experimentation excelled over a mere 
observational science. Variables could be isolated with experimentation by 
controlling other factors and the reason for doing so “is to find out what special 
conditions are present when the effect occurs and absent when it fails to occur. 
These special conditions are then substituted for the gross fact, or regarded as 
its principle – the key to understanding it.”39 Where spectator theories rely upon 
an act of apprehension to come to know a fact, Dewey held that the active 
experimentation upon isolated variables allowed for “mental inertia, laziness and 
unjustifiable conservativism”40 to be avoided by relying upon public inter-
subjective data rather than private and subjective data.41 
                                                 
37 Dewey, John. How We Think, p. 149. Italics are in original text. 
 
38 Dewey held the empirical method to be one of passive observation alone. Merely 
witnessing the flow of sensory perception is inadequate because it can not control for variables 
and is just as likely as not to light upon which variable played a part in bringing about the 
consequence as any other passive method. 
 
39 Dewey, John. How We Think, p. 151. 
 
40 Dewey, John. How We Think, p. 148. 
 
41 Interestingly enough Dewey even believed the inner-most thoughts of an individual 
were inter-subjective insofar as they occur in language and can be communicated with language, 
but obviously only become fully public when shared. 
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But the scientific method does not always involve existential materials 
such as tables, chairs or electrons. Even someone sitting perfectly still in a chair 
can be active in Dewey’s term if they are utilizing the potential nature of symbols. 
Dewey stated that “by means of symbols … we act without acting. We perform 
experiments by means of symbols which have results that are themselves only 
symbolized, and which do not therefore commit us to actual or existential 
consequences.”42 The ability to symbolize our involvements with our 
environments allows us to play with the symbols in a way analogous to 
experimentation. We can perform operations which manipulate and transform 
symbols rather than manipulating and transforming existential material. In this 
way we perform a type of trial and error where the number of trials can increase 
dramatically without putting our biological organism into possible danger. The 
manipulation of symbols can range from a scientist working with a physics 
equation in the hopes of instituting some dangerous experiment so that she may 
better be prepared for its results, or the manipulation could be as common place 
as thinking whether it would be best to visit the bank first rather than the grocery 
store. Either way, this is a form of acting (albeit without existentially acting) and 
therefore still qualifies as experimental operation.43 
Dewey held action to be more than just symbolic but existential as well. 
Existential action is a concert of an organism and its habits, especially in 
                                                 
42 Dewey, John. The Quest for Certainty, LW 4.121. Emphasis mine. 
 
43 In this way even the “phenomenological” research which deals with “private” feelings 
and sensations can be communicated by way of symbols and can be experimented upon by way 
of symbolic manipulation. It is important to note that even while this is analogous, perhaps 
identical to, existential experimentation, merely symbolic experimentation will never solve 
existential problems; it will only ever formulate their possible solution. 
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relationship to a practice in a context, or environing condition, which the 
organism has mastered. In one formulation of Dewey’s he refers to “experienced” 
as someone who has much exposure (i.e. many previously formed habits) with 
something, as for instance when discussing someone who has sailing experience 
who hears a specific loud noise while at sea: 
If, however, the sailor is experienced, the consequences of 
his prior-tested and verified inferences enter directly into the 
object of perception; the noise will be, to him, a sail blown 
out of its bolt ropes.44 
The noise referred to in this quote does not enter into the experienced sailor’s 
mind as a sonic sensation; it is “experienced” inferentially as a known event of 
“sail-blowing-its-bolt-ropes.” It is unlikely that the experienced sailor would even 
speak of the specific noise heard and would instead refer to the instance as a 
blown rope.45 
But “experienced” does not just mean someone who has acquired some 
special skill; it also refers to anticipations based upon a wealth of past 
encounters or acquaintance with environmental factors: 
To be acquainted is to anticipate to some extent, on the 
basis of prior experience. I am, say, barely acquainted with 
                                                 
44 Dewey, John. Essays, Reviews, Miscellany, and "Impressions of Soviet Russia," ed. Jo 
Ann Boydston, LW 3.89. 
 
45 Inference is a touchy subject though, for even the most “experienced” inference can be 
wrong, where wrong is understood as leading to consequences other than those expected. 
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Mr. Smith: then I have no extended body of associated 
qualities along with those palpably present, but at least some 
one suggested trait occurs; his nose, his tone of voice, the 
place where I saw him, his calling in life, an interesting 
anecdote about him, etc. To be acquainted is to know what a 
thing is like in some particular way. If one is acquainted with 
the smell of a flower it means that the smell is not just smell, 
but reminds one of some other experienced thing which 
stands in continuity with the smell. There is thus supplied a 
condition of control over or purchase upon what is present, 
the possibility of translating it into terms of some other trait 
not now sensibly present.46 
As is evidenced by this passage, Dewey held that even smelling a flower was an 
extraordinarily active affair involving not just current sensation but also judgments 
made in the past based upon prior acquaintance and anticipations of what is 
expected. Past acquaintance affords a recommendation for an action to take in 
order to bring about a condition for the possibility of the expected or desired 
result, but the action still must be taken if results are desired. Action is required in 
order to bring about equilibrium; just symbolizing the act only allows one to 
consider alternatives not currently present, it does not put into place the 
conditions to bring them about. 
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For Dewey, experimentation is the only path to bringing about desired 
results, even in cases of objects which are not directly present, such as distant 
stars: 
While the astronomer cannot change the remote stars, even 
he no longer merely gazes. If he cannot change the stars 
themselves, he can at least by lens and prism change their 
light as it reaches the earth; he can lay traps for discovering 
changes which would otherwise escape notice. Instead of 
taking an antagonistic attitude toward change and denying it 
to the stars because of their divinity and perfection, he is on 
constant and alert watch to find some change through which 
he can form an inference as to the formation of stars and 
systems of stars.47 
This demonstrates that even if we do not actively manipulate the object itself and 
instead manipulate its consequences (such as the light rays given off by a distant 
star) still the only path to knowing is through manipulation and active 
experimentation (in this case by means of prism and lenses regarding absorption 
lines). Astronomy toiled for centuries without advance until experimentation of 
this sort allowed scientists to discover the chemical composition of stars that are 
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so distant (perhaps even possibly dangerous) as to be impossible to directly 
experiment upon.48 
It is important to reiterate that merely changing “subjective” interpretations 
(i.e. beliefs) is not the same as actively changing existential conditions. The only 
way for problems to be solved, outside of blind chance, is for intelligent actions to 
be taken which result in changes in existential material.49 It was for this reason 
that, when Dewey grasped the importance of the recent scientific theory of 
indeterminacy, he stated 
The principle of indeterminacy thus presents itself as the 
final step in the dislodgment of the old spectator theory of 
knowledge. It marks the acknowledgment, within scientific 
procedure itself, of the fact that knowing is one kind of 
interaction which goes on within the world. Knowing marks 
the conversion of undirected changes into changes directed 
toward an intended conclusion.50 
By recognizing the act of observation as changing the object observed, scientists 
had finally grasped an active theory of knowing and thrown off the final vestibules 
of the spectator theory. 
                                                 
48 Reference to chemical composition is by way of absorption lines on light sensitive film.  
 
49 A common misconception about Dewey’s theory of action is equating it to fascist 
“theories” of pure action. Dewey’s theory differs in that he supports intelligent action rather than 
action for its own sake. 
 
50 Dewey. John. The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 4: 1929, The 
Quest for Certainty, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, LW 4.163 
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Inquiry is Experimentalism 
Dewey held that the path to intelligent decisions about actions to be taken 
in order to bring about existential change can be arrived at by way of the 
methods of science, a process he called inquiry:51 It is easy to confuse Dewey’s 
high praise for the methods of science with high praise for the specific findings of 
science. But he was also a fallibalist and held that any one scientific finding is 
prone to error, therefore Dewey’s praise of the methods of controlled inquiry 
should not be taken as some bare scientism.52 It is also easy to confuse his 
recommendation of the usage of the methods of science in other fields as some 
form of technocracy but Dewey did not recommend utilizing specific scientific 
findings as ways of overcoming cultural obstacles. Instead he recommended the 
practice of calm, controlled, active, experimental manipulation of cultural values 
in order to seek solutions to social problems.53 This recommendation is made 
instead of reliance upon intuition, divine intervention or supernaturalism of any 
stripe. By utilizing observation, postulation, experimentation and judgment based 
upon cultivated experience, Dewey believed the problems faced could be 
consummated and solved. 
                                                 
51 Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 104-5. “Inquiry is the controlled or 
directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is as determinate in its 
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52 Interestingly enough, new data about the speed of light appears to invalidate previous 
conclusions about the expansion of the universe, thereby validating Dewey’s conclusion about 
how science should not be dogmatic in its conclusions but rather stable in its methodology. 
 
53 Dewey believed that values were not devoid of “facts” so that by changing the “facts” 
we could trace what the effects of those value meant in concrete matters. Also, he was not 
opposed to utilizing specific findings of science; I am only here claiming that he meant the method 
not the findings when referring to solving social issues by way of science. 
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But problems do not arise ex nihilo and instead arise within a situation. 
Situations are complex wholes and not a mere aggregate of parts, 
What is designated by the word ‘situation’ is not a single 
object or event or set of events. For we never experience nor 
form judgments about objects and events in isolation, but 
only in connection with a contextual whole. This latter is what 
is called a ‘situation’.54 
Problems, for Dewey, are not merely psychological, not merely problems of 
belief, but rather, are pervasive and environmental disharmonies amongst the 
various aspects of the situation. When the relations amongst those parts are out 
of balance in some way, a problem has arisen. When problems arise in this way, 
and if an organism capable of inquiry is one aspect of the problem, the organism 
either suffers the consequences of the problem or engages in inquiry in an 
attempt to somehow regain equilibrium. The consummation and solution to 
problems faced comes about as the consequence of a spatio-temporal process 
of inquiry. Inquiry is not something humans engage in for mere curiosity’s sake 
but rather because they are faced with obstacles which are insurmountable given 
the current habits of the individual or culture. While there is no definite pattern to 
inquiry, insofar as the individual steps of inquiry can be skipped, had all at once 
or had in no particular order, nevertheless Dewey held there to be a pattern to 
inquiry, insofar as inquiry always involves some, or all, of these elements. 
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Antecedent Conditions: 
The first elements of an inquiry are the “antecedent conditions” which are 
also sometimes referred to as the “felt difficulties.” Dewey states that many, if not 
most, problems are felt long before they are known; they are unsettled, uncertain 
or disturbed. This feeling is, on its face, non-cognitive in the sense that they are 
not the results of inquiry. Case in point these non-cognitive feelings are usually 
the impetus toward inquiry. This felt difficulty is what Dewey, following 
Santayana, calls a tertiary quality which is experienced as the overriding 
qualitative experience of the situation. 
Disharmony between organism and environment is as much an aspect of 
the situation as spatio-temporality, color and other qualitative aspects. In this 
respect the felt difficulty in a situation is existential; they exist in the situation, in 
that the difficulty exists as a consequence of environmental interplay with 
organism and not as a mere psychological state. The difficulty exists as an 
imbalance between organism and environment and in the existence of the 
difficulty, the feeling of disequilibrium is had. Consider for instance the case of 
hunger: while it is a feeling, it involves organic transactions which can not be 
merely willed away. Existential material, in the form of food, is required before the 
psychological feeling is assuaged. Therefore the felt difficulty is a requirement of 
organic action in the face of an environing situation. The organism must act to re-
acquire equilibrium.55 
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Institution of a Problem: 
Institution of a problem is actually the first step of inquiry because “to see 
that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step in inquiry.”56 While the existential 
conditions are what exist prior to, and are in many ways that which motivates the 
organism to inquire, they are not themselves steps of the process of inquiry. To 
distinguish that the antecedent conditions are problematic, in effect to grant that 
the feeling of disharmony relates to the conditions the organism finds itself in, is 
the dawn of inquiry. It should be noted that this is not the same as indicating what 
is problematic, merely identifying that there exists a problematic situation.57 
The Determination of a Problem-Solution: 
Once it is established that a problem exists the next step is “the 
determination of a problem-solution.” While it may be possible for the 
determination of what is problematic to co-emerge with a suggestion for its 
solution, these situations are typically well-worn paths of inquiry; either 
theoretical formulation of situations similar enough to, or identical to, this one that 
have been long considered and contemplated, or the organism has been in 
situations of this sort on prior occasions. Needless to say it is not necessary for 
both identification of a problem and suggestion of a solution to simultaneously 
arise. In situations where the two do not co-emerge, formulation of the problem 
can take a considerable amount of time. Determining just what constituent 
elements make up this problematic situation is a recommended course of action. 
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57 Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 107-108. 
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Regardless of how confusing or indeterminate a situation is, there are generally 
elements which are determinate: there is a somewhere, a sometime or a 
something which stands out as pertinent. Discerning settled constituents aids in 
determining in what or where the problem lies. Observation will be the medium in 
which settling constituents will occur. 
When the constituent aspects of the existential situation are determined 
enough to formulate a possible solution, it will “present itself” or “suggest itself” 
as an idea. Dewey defines an idea as “anticipated consequences, forecasts of 
what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to 
observed conditions.”58 Here an idea is taken as a possible solution, hypothetical 
in nature, and not taken dogmatically or as anything other than a suggestion. If 
the constituents of the situation are made more stable by observation then the 
stronger and more likely a hypothetical solution for the problematic situation 
becomes.59 There exists a strong balance between the “facts” of the problem with 
the proposed solutions to it; a possible paraphrase of Dewey on this issue could 
read: facts without ideas are trivial and ideas without facts are meaningless. 
Reasoning: 
When a set of “facts” are accepted as pertinent to the problem at hand, 
another step of the inquiry is to examine the meaning of these “facts” in virtue of 
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59 Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 108-111. This radical redefinition of 
idea follows logically from Dewey’s pragmatic concerns with future consequences rather than 
correspondence with static reality. Attention should be paid to the similarity of concepts between 
the formation of an idea in Dewey’s theories and the formation of a hypothesis in Charles Peirce’s 
abductive reasoning.  
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their membership to a system of meanings. As Dewey states “[i]f such and such 
a relation of meanings is accepted, then we are committed to such and such 
other relations of meaning because of their membership in the same system.”60 If 
in the course of an inquiry a specific fact stands out as relevant, and that fact is 
located within a constellation of other facts, meanings and ideas, then the 
presence of the first fact commits the inquiry to taking seriously the constellation 
of ideas as also (indirectly) relevant to the inquiry. An example is in order: 
imagine that in the course of investigating a stellar phenomenon such as gamma 
ray bursts, the Astro-physicist measures the potency of the burst and its red-shift 
on gases between earth and the origin of the burst. At first the Astro-physicist 
may be alarmed by the sheer magnitude of the bursts; at the distances these 
bursts are occurring at combined with the power-levels of these bursts; the first 
conclusion is that these explosions must violate the very laws of physics 
themselves. Entities so massive as to be physically impossible would have to be 
energetically exploding in all directions, nearly instantaneously, in order to 
produce bursts of the magnitude measured. The problem presented itself: either 
Einstein was wrong, the readings were wrong or there needed to be another 
explanation for these events.61 But within the constellation of ideas that is Astro-
physics, there exist phenomenon of beaming, where force is directed in narrow 
channels rather than radiated outward in all directions. If the neutron bursts were 
                                                 
60 Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 111. 
 
61 Ellis, John and Hagelin, John S.  “Search for Violations of Quantum Mechanics,” 
Nuclear Physics B Volume 241, Issue 2, 23 July 1984, Pages 381-405. 
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occurring in beams rather than bursts, the physical laws would not be violated 
and all of the other relevant facts could be explained. 
This example showcases how one piece of relevant information, combined 
with the contextually relevant information, can lead the inquirer, by way of 
reasoning, to other pertinent pieces of information to aid in the resolution of the 
problem at hand. By means of these relevant data the problematic situation can 
“instigate and direct an experiment that will disclose precisely those conditions 
which have the maximum possible force in determining whether the hypothesis 
should be accepted or rejected.”62 Many people draw inferences without even 
realizing the act of inference itself is distinct from observation.63 
The Operational Character of Facts-Meanings: 
This stage of inquiry is where the observed facts and proposed ideas 
come together as operational components. The observed facts are operational 
because no fact acts as evidence on its own; a given fact only acts as evidence 
within a constellation of facts and meanings which interpenetrate. Dewey stated 
that “some observed facts point to an idea that stands for a possible solution.”64 
The facts operate by directing the inquirer to other facts and ideas, by means of 
its existential relation to those facts. Take an imaginary case of criminal 
                                                 
62 Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 112.  
 
63 It could be pointed out at this point that what Sir Author Conan Doyle referred to as 
“deduction” in the “Sherlock Holmes” series was, in fact, reasoning by way of inference and 
induction as much as deduction. One could also point out that as much abduction, the principle 
put forth by Aristotle and furthered by Charles S. Peirce, was closer to the principle being used, 
and is also what Dewey is referring to here.   
 
64 Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 113. 
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malfeasance where footprints at the scene of a crime indicate boots, and mud on 
a boot owned by a suspect possibly indicates their presence at the scene of a 
crime, warranting a follow-up inquiry. The facts can constrain or expand an 
inquiry by way of their operational character. 
Likewise ideas are operational insofar as they function as hypothesis 
which direct observation in its search for other facts or for formulation of 
experiments that will confirm facts as relevant to the inquiry at hand. It is 
important to re-iterate that Dewey held ideas to be hypotheses of possible 
actions to be taken rather than static copies of antecedent reality. Because both 
facts and ideas are operational aspects of inquiry, they can co-operate: facts can 
form an ordered whole to suggest a hypothesis (idea) and ideas can direct the 
observer to new facts in order to more fully form an ordered whole. Neither facts 
nor ideas, in themselves, are adequate to solve problems, and even with both 
ideas and facts in hand it is only by way of experimentation that the problem is 
resolved. 
In the example previously mentioned, now the Astro-physicist has a 
phenomenon in mind, neutron beaming, to search for (i.e. here it operates as a 
hypothesis) in order to explain the massive bursts. When it is discovered that 
collapsing massive stars produce neutron bursts (i.e. additional facts of the 
matter present themselves) as they form black holes, suddenly the confusing 
phenomenon of neutron beams of massive magnitudes is explained. It is by way 
of directing planetary and orbital satellites at collapsing massive stars, and 
recording the data from such phenomenon, that the hypothesis is “confirmed” 
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and the initial problem ceases to be problematic: physical laws aren’t being 
violated and now an additional physical phenomenon is explained as well.65 
Consummation and Warrant 
The actions and processes which consummate an inquiry reconstruct the 
problematic situation and further result in a warranted assertion.66 The 
reconstructed situation now has continuity of experience rather than the break 
representative of a problematic situation. Said differently, whatever experimental 
action or process that consummated the inquiry brings about a restoration of 
continuity and the inquirer is now able to craft a sentence (or series of sentences) 
that sum up the action and processes called the warranted assertion. Contrary to 
contemporary theories of language, the warranted assertion is not the 
consummation of an inquiry; rather the process which overcame the problematic 
situation is what consummates and the warranted assertion merely follows like 
smoke to fire. 
That said, the warranted assertion can act as a guide to future inquirers in 
order to aid them in their own consummation, but the words and language should 
not be mistaken for the actions taken. When Edison sought a light-bulb, the 
words “electric current run through a filament, suspended in an inert gas, heats it 
to a temperature that produces light” does not produce light; the construction of 
                                                 
65 Dermer, Charles D. and Holmes, Jeremy M. “Cosmic Rays from Gamma Ray Bursts in 
the Galaxy,” The Astrophysical Journal 2005, vol. 628 (2), n. 1, pp. L21-L24.  
 
66 The important aspect of this sentence, pertinent to the discussion at hand, is that 
action is required to bring about change, mere conceptualization is inadequate, although it will 
result in a statement (or many such statements) which can be understood by others. Until such 
time as there is something done to the concrete existent situation though, consummation has not 
occurred.  
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an existential device which performs these processes is what produces light and 
the phrase is the consequence of the actions and judgments made, but can also 
stand as a road-map for future construction of such devices. Whether the 
warranted assertion leads an independent inquirer to the construction of a light 
bulb or the construction of a light bulb leads to the formation of the assertion, the 
actual construction is what overcomes the problem, not the assertion. 
Therefore consummation only comes about when the existential situation 
is resolved, when the problem which prompted the inquiry dissipates, not just 
when a statement is made. This aspect of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is essential 
to his system because the practice of manipulating and adapting existential 
situations rather than focusing exclusively on linguistic practice differs from much 
of 20th century philosophy. This emphasis places philosophy back into the realm 
of practice and not merely as a theoretical endeavor. 
For purposes of finding the conditions which can make possible a great 
community, the utilization of inquiry to overcome existent problematic situations, 
rather than appeal to superstition, magical thinking, intuition or other methods, is 
the first and most important condition to be met. If a culture does not utilize 
inquiry to overcome its problems, it will inevitably flounder when faced with 
problems; it may overcome a handful of situations by pluck and luck, but without 
controlled inquiry guiding its actions, no culture can remain in harmony with its 
environment for any great length of time. The entailments of this conclusion on 
cultural institutions such as education are enormous, especially if a given 
culture’s educational institutions are based largely, or entirely, upon passive 
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reception rather than experimental inquiry. Even in those communities utilized 
controlled experimental inquiry when seeking solutions to problems they face, if 
these conclusions are not acted upon then the problems will continue. Examples 
exist of cultures which knew of the results of controlled inquiry and did little or 
nothing based upon the findings since Dewey visited both China67 and Turkey68, 
and made recommendations based upon inquiry.69 The connection which exists 
between utilizing controlled inquiry to find solutions to problematic situations and 
actively pursuing the overcoming of the problems with those solutions will be 
further discussed in chapter six. Even if the great community remains an 
unfulfilled quest, the utilization of controlled inquiry in overcoming the difficulties 
humans encounter should be a goal to be achieved. Were a culture to inculcate 
the method of inquiry, rather than superstition, intuition or some other equally 
unreliable method, its members would benefit greatly as they more easily found 
equilibrium with environing conditions. 
Given that the use of inquiry is the first of many conditions to be met in 
order to bring about the great community, the natural next question is what other 
conditions need to be met? Once Dewey had taken his pragmatic turn the first 
major problem that faced him was the question of human nature. The then-
                                                 
67 Dewey’s two year trip the China is followed in John Dewey in China: To Teach and to 
Learn, by Wang, Jessica Ching-Sze, SUNY Press, New York, New York, 2008.  
 
68 Dewey traveled to Turkey in 1924 on behest of Sefa bey, Turkish Prime Minister of 
Public Instruction, assessed Turkey’s educational system and recommended changes based 
upon his findings (Middle Works 15.301-7). A recent study upon this visit is chronicled and 
discussed in The Republic, Educational Reform, and Dewey. Edited by John P. Anton and Pinar 
Canevi. Forum Istanbul Publication. Bilingual Edition. Istanbul, Turkey, 2007. 
 
69 A full inquiry into the results of what, and whether the recommendations were followed 
would divert too much from the main point here, nevertheless examples exist for those interested 
in seeing the concrete results of the implementing (or lack thereof) of these conceptual 
apparatus. 
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popular philosophical heritage held an individualistic belief which was based 
upon the epistemic conclusions of the spectator theory of knowing. Once Dewey 
rejected the foundations for the individualistic theory, he was forced to explore an 
alternative theory of human nature as well. 
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Chapter Three: The Nature of the Individual 
This chapter will explore the nature of the individual and will rely heavily upon 
the following works by Dewey: Freedom and Culture, Human Nature and 
Conduct, Art as Experience, Experience and Education, The Public and its 
Problems, Democracy and Education, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 
Individualism Old and New but primarily from The Problems of Men. 
Given that the utilization of inquiry is Dewey’s preferred method for 
overcoming problems, the dominant view of the nature of the individual was one 
of the greatest problematic situations that Dewey’s project faces in its 
acceptance. Said differently, Dewey believed investigation into human nature 
constituted one of the most pressing philosophic issues. The dominant cultural 
view on human nature during Dewey’s life had been almost entirely adopted from 
an idealistic position which had been modified by philosophers of the modern 
period to apply to cultural upheavals of their time.70 Dewey’s criticisms of the 
spectator theory of knowing applies equally well against supernatural theories of 
human nature, as Dewey held them to be roughly equivalent. Where modernistic 
theories of knowing held the individual to be supernatural, pre-formed, isolated, 
passive and distinct entity from the world, Dewey’s theory of human nature was 
different insofar as it held the individual to be natural, plastic, continuous, and 
                                                 
70 For instance John Locke’s theory of the human nature and its concomitant human 
rights as being granted by God as applied to the construction of the Constitution of the United 
States of America. 
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active participant of the world. To clarify Dewey’s position on the nature of the 
individual requires first exploring Dewey’s theory of human nature as distinct from 
culture and then exploring how it is that an individual is formed, by way of the 
powers latent in human nature, within a natural environment. 
Overcoming this problem will pave the way toward forming communities, 
since rugged individualism by definition is in opposition to communal 
arrangements. Social arrangements, such as social contracts, are done to avoid 
loss of life, liberty or property, but only ever grudgingly. By Dewey’s theory, social 
arrangements constitute the very possibility of liberty and therefore communal 
institutions and arrangements are sought willingly. 
Human Nature 
Whenever there is an aspect of human behavior which is found 
undesirable or uncomfortable, it is typically the first recourse to blame it on 
human nature. But 
[i]f we take all the communities, peoples, classes, tribes and 
nations that ever existed, we may be sure that since human 
nature in its native constitution is the relative constant, it 
cannot be appealed to, in isolation, to account for the 
multitude of diversities presented by different forms of 
association.71 
One of the only meaningful constants which can be appealed to is that cultures 
and habits are acquired and transmitted, and that the biological needs and wants 
of humanity have not changed, but have only been channeled to new activities in 
                                                 
71 Dewey. John. Freedom and Culture, p. 22. 
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attempts at satisfying them. If this is the human nature being harangued, then so 
be it, but I believe it unlikely. More likely individuals are confusing acquired and 
therefore second nature, with native or first nature. If Dewey’s assumption is 
right, then it is important to distinguish that which is acquired from that which is 
native, and this differentiation stands as a problem to be overcome by way of 
inquiry. 
Dewey believed that the native equipment, while absolutely essential for 
understanding the nature of individual behavior, was not as active of a force in 
human behavior as that which was acquired. In order to proceed one must 
therefore ask Dewey to enumerate just what he believed was native. To begin 
would require a short list of needs: 
Needs for food and drink and for moving about, for example, 
are so much a part of our being that we cannot imagine any 
condition under which they would cease to be. There are 
other things not so directly physical that seem to me equally 
engrained in human nature. I would mention as examples 
the need for some kind of companionship; the need for 
exhibiting energy, for bringing one’s powers to bear upon 
surrounding conditions; the need for both cooperation with 
and emulation of one’s fellows for mutual aid and combat 
alike; the need for some sort of aesthetic expression and 
satisfaction; the need to lead and to follow, etc.72 
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These basic needs are unavoidably parts of human nature and, as he notes, will 
likely not disappear until humans likewise disappear: “[c]ertain basic needs and 
emotions are permanent. But they are capable of finding expression in ways that 
are radically different from the ways in which they now currently operate.”73 For a 
21st century American reader, what is telling is what is absent from this list. A 
need for friendship is present but a need for war is absent. A need for societal 
acceptance is absent but the need for aesthetic expression and satisfaction 
makes the list. A need for materialistic items and acquisition of money is absent 
but the need for cooperation is present. Even if no other metric were appealed to 
than this short list of needs, many present-day cultures would fail to muster as 
capable of directing their individuals to pursue those activities which would 
secure and satisfy their needs. 
Primarily, humans utilize habits to satisfy these needs; habits are 
potentials insofar as they lie in wait, ready to be put to use. Even in activity, 
habits are potential until they are engaged with existential material toward a 
definite end. Otherwise habits are predispositions to actions to be taken when 
situations arise which prompt their use; they are, in a word, conditional.74 
Through this observation Dewey makes possible a criticism of thinkers who 
would claim that war is an essential component of human nature, a potential 
laying in wait to be unleashed. He states: 
                                                 
73 Dewey, John. Problems of Men, p. 189. Dewey’s admittance to their permanence will 
be of special interest later, but I have found no definite and exclusive list of the emotions in his 
work. 
 
74 This is not to be confused with “conditioned” such as operant conditioning. Dewey was 
opposed to Skinner’s theory because it was so heavily based upon repetition. More will be said 
on habits in the following chapter.  
 48 
I have already said that, in my opinion, combativeness is a 
constituent part of human nature. But I have also said that 
the manifestations of these native elements are subject to 
change because they are affected by custom and tradition. 
War does not exist because man has combative instincts, 
but because social conditions and forces have led, almost 
forced, those ‘instincts’ into this channel. There are a large 
number of other channels in which the need for combat has 
been satisfied, and there are other channels not yet 
discovered or explored into which it could be led with equal 
satisfaction.75 
The potential component of human nature that is present in the persistence of 
war is the need for combativeness. But this need can be actualized based upon 
cultural and traditional channels. These channels have been determined either 
by social conditions or environmental needs to be lethal in form, but they need 
not be. It should be noted that combative needs are reinforced by other auxiliary 
cultural norms such as the veneration of patriotism, especially in the form of 
combat for one’s nation. As long as patriotism’s only expression is war, and as 
long as the dominant channel for expressing the need for combat is lethal 
conflict, war will persist. But patriotism needn’t be exclusively a war-time activity, 
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nor need it be directed solely at promoting one’s own nation.76 Quoting Hinton, 
Dewey stated that “the only way to abolish war was to make peace heroic.”77 
The confusion of those who believe war is native is that they have confused an 
impulsion and a habit. Dewey described an impulse by saying that: 
An impulse is specialized and particular; it is, even when 
instinctive, simply a part of the mechanism involved in a 
more complete adaptation with the environment.78 
Impulses are simple and muscular inclinations such as the motivation to flare the 
nostrils in the presence of a pungent smell. These impulses are direct and 
immediate in their reaction and the action they compel, but they are simplistic 
and able to be overridden by habits. Impulses, in virtue of their immediacy, are 
fleeting. They orient only aspects of the organism. Alternately Dewey describes 
impulsions whereby 
‘Impulsion’ designates a movement outward and forward of 
the whole organism in which special impulses are auxiliary. It 
is the craving of the living creature for food as distinct from 
the reactions of tongue and lips that are involved in 
swallowing; the turning toward light of the body as a whole, 
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like the heliotropism of plants, as distinct from the following 
of a particular light by the eyes.79 
While salivation in the presence of food would be an impulse, the seeking out of 
food would be an impulsion. An impulsion orients the whole organism and not 
merely parts of it. These native potentials are ready to be called forth in the 
presence of environing conditions, but Dewey was loath to refer to these as 
instincts. Instincts are more complete in their actions, for even impulsions are not 
as developed as the migratory instincts of birds or the honeycomb building of 
bees. The human organism requires the cultivation of habitudes in order to 
achieve the level of completion of activities that animals largely have as 
instinctual inheritance. It is because of the incompleteness of impulses, and 
impulsions, that Dewey stated human potential so far outstrips that of other 
animals. 
While Dewey referred to the purposiveness of both impulses and 
impulsions, he did not equate either to an inborn purpose: 
A genuine purpose always starts with an impulse. 
Obstruction of the immediate execution of an impulse 
converts it into a desire. Nevertheless neither impulse nor 
desire is in itself a purpose.80 
Impulses and impulsions contribute to purpose but are not in themselves 
completed purpose. Impulses are more akin to an inclination to act rather than a 
fully formed act in themselves. Frustrated impulses, what Dewey calls desires, 
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are therefore obstructed tendencies; tendencies which have been frustrated. 
Habits can be called to action by way of impulses and desires, but thinking can 
short-circuit and override this tendency. But even thinking requires an impulse 
and a habit to engage. Habits of thought are called by impulses, even when they 
are done so in order to frustrate another impulse or habit. As Dewey stated, 
“[i]mpulses are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn, they 
are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing 
their quality.”81 What is left unsaid here is that impulses can also insure rote and 
comfortable responses, especially if the habit of learning has not been deeply 
ingrained. 
While human needs may not change as long as humans exist, the outlets 
and channels of the expression of those needs can change by way of habits and 
actions taken. A need for combat can be expressed by way of competition in 
sports and industry. A need for leadership can come in the form of emulating the 
direction of a person’s approach without directly copying the specific actions they 
take. Likewise a need for aesthetic expression can come in the more traditional 
form of painting, sculpture or literature but can also be found in the clash of 
athletes of sports or creating new outlets for creative endeavors such as games. 
In this way social reform is possible even when it is granted that human 
nature is fixed and unchanging. Our nature is protean and plastic; our nature is to 
acquire new forms of behavior and new habits and “those who hold that 
proposals for social change, even of rather a profound character, are impossible 
and utopian because of the fixity of human nature confuse the resistance to 
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change that comes from acquired habits with that which comes from original 
human nature.”82 This may be the one of the most important points for Dewey: 
most people who oppose social change blame humankind’s inability to adjust 
upon fixed aspects of human nature. Dewey grants that there are fixed aspects 
of human nature: they are our needs and impulses. While the expression of 
those needs and impulses can change; the difficulty is that habits are recalcitrant 
to modification. The confusion among opponents of social modification lies in the 
challenge of adaptation of acquired habits, not in the fixity of human nature. Said 
differently, the possibility for social change comes by way of interruption of 
existing habits and reconstruction of those existing habits by way of education.83 
One aspect of the environment for humans is other humans and their 
actions. Therefore the reluctance of other members of one’s culture to change 
proves equal parts condition and challenge while attempting to change a habit. 
The habits of others are a condition insofar as they act as environing situations 
for one’s own actions and they are a challenge because the recalcitrant habits 
represent an easy and available expression of needs and desires. Dewey stated 
that “habit is the mainspring of human action and habits are formed for the most 
part under the influence of the customs of a group.”84 Here Dewey is saying that 
among adults, other adult’s habits act as one of the greatest blockages to habit-
reformation while among children the adult’s habits act as one of the only means 
available for habit formation by way of emulation. As Dewey stated, “Conduct is 
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always shared; this is the difference between it and physiological process. It is 
not an ethical ‘ought’ that conduct should be social. It is social, whether bad or 
good.”85 It was Dewey’s recommendation for social reform to begin with early 
education; adapt the plastic habits of the youth while they are still easily molded 
rather than tackling adults who are set in their ways. Consider by way of analogy 
a sapling compared to an ancient oak. While a simple wire can direct the growth 
of a sapling, it would take tremendously strong steel girders and massive effort to 
reshape the enormous branches of an ancient oak tree into new directions. 
Likewise, if a culture is to change and grow toward the great community, habit 
reconstruction and formation would be the guide-wire upon which its growth 
would occur. 
Humans are Beings Capable of Experience 
Enumerating human needs and our ability to acquire habits does not 
exhaust the equipment humans are born with. Humans are also organisms 
capable of experience. 
Experience is a matter of the interaction of organism with its 
environment, an environment that is human as well as 
physical, that includes the materials of traditions and 
institutions as well as local surroundings. The organism 
brings with it through its own structure, native and acquired, 
forces that play a part in the interaction. The self acts as well 
as undergoes, and its undergoings are not impressions 
stamped upon an inert wax but depend upon the way the 
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organism reacts and responds. There is no experience in 
which the human contribution is not a factor in determining 
what actually happens. The organism is a force not a 
transparency.”86 
The mere presence of humans in an environment means that modifications to 
that environment will occur; modifications will continue as long as humans are 
present in that environment merely because humans, in living and existing, 
modify their surroundings to a great extent. If humans fail in this modification, it is 
likely their survival fails as well. Consider the case of a culture that lives in an 
extreme environmental situation such as a barren desert or blighted tundra; if 
hunting, clothing and shelter are not constructed from the very stuff of the 
environment then it is unlikely if said culture will persist. Additionally, it is because 
of our native structure that we acclimate to our environment just as we do, for 
“there is a constitution common to all normal individuals. They have the same 
hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions; they are fed with the 
same food, hurt by the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by 
the same remedies, warmed and cooled by the same variations in climate.”87 
Experience is not the idle spectating of a remote and disinterested mind; instead 
it is the vital transaction of an animal, instilled with a definite structure, with its 
ever changing surrounding environment. The chasm of skepticism about the 
existence of an external world has virtually no meaning to a creature that, in its 
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hunger seeks food, or one that in the heat of sexual desire seeks a mate. Instead 
the creature seeks, in the world, for some way to slake the felt need. 
While Dewey utilizes the term “experience” from the British Empiricist 
tradition, he has so thoroughly modified it as to make it a completely new term. 
The Empiricists meant by this term a constant influx of sensations that were 
atomic in nature. By associating these atomic impressions humans were capable 
of formulating more advanced and complex ideas. Dewey retained very little of 
the meaning of this term and instead held experience to be a field rather than 
atomic and discriminating rather than just associative. Whole situations are felt 
and from within this situation specific aspects are isolated and selected as worthy 
of attention. 
Humans as Cultural Beings 
Native equipment, while present, is not nearly as important as acquired 
habits in understanding human behavior for while “[h]abit is the mainspring of 
human activity” it should be noted that “habits are formed for the most part under 
the influence of the customs of a group.”88 If one wishes to understand human 
behavior, the focus should not be on human nature but rather on culture. Yet 
racial essentialists have long claimed that differences exist between the natures 
of people of different “races” than themselves. But Dewey stated that “[n]either 
the savage nor the civilized man is what he is by native constitution but by the 
culture in which he participates.”89 Ironically, the differences are in the habits and 
customs acquired and the similarity is in the native composition. The essentially 
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human is little more than capacity for emotions, needs, experience, inquiry, habit 
formation and the acquisition of language. But all humans, as humans, possess 
this; we have more in common than different in this regard. Those behaviors 
associated with a specific “races” are more often cultural practices performed by 
ethnically related people. Gender roles differ from society to society and very 
little, if anything, can be pointed at as essentially female or male, aside from 
reproductive organs.90 As Dewey stated, 
The problem is to find out the way in which the elements of a 
culture interact with each other and the way in which the 
elements of human nature are caused to interact with one 
another under conditions set by their interaction with the 
existing environment.91 
The difficulty in discerning just what is attributable to human nature and what is 
attributable to culture is one of the central problems of philosophy but it is 
important to note at this point that just culture and human nature are not the only 
elements to be observed; it is also important to note that humans and human 
cultures exist within the medium of nature and the actions of humans and 
cultures directly affect their environments. This is painfully obvious by means of 
scientific inquiries which show upcoming climactic changes which are due in 
large part to cultural practices brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the 
mechanization of labor and the burning of fossil fuels to power this 
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mechanization. One of the aspects of Dewey’s philosophy which will be most 
important in the coming decades will hinge upon the need for humans to find 
cultural harmony with their environing factors or find the harmony of the grave. 
But even here we find that Dewey has advice for us: cultures can co-exist insofar 
as they communicate. The refusal to discuss, cutting off diplomatic ties, refusing 
to engage in dialogue will likely lead to conflict. While communication is not 
guaranteed to soothe ruffled feathers, the absence of meaningful alternatives 
speaks volumes. But communication is a pre-requisite, a necessary aspect, not a 
solution. The solution involves inclusion, across cultures, in formation and 
direction of activities. It also involves participation across cultures in those 
directions and activities. Insofar as one group dictates and demands of another, 
there is no cross-cultural communication; there is monologue and ultimatum. If a 
great community is possible, its cultural activities must be inclusive, participatory 
and openly communicated. 
Humans are Habitual Beings 
In many ways habits are stronger than the impulses and the needs which 
they represent. “Admission that men may be brought by long habit to hug their 
chains implies a belief that second or acquired nature is stronger than original 
nature.”92 The need may not change and the impulse may be frustrated, but the 
habit will continue to be activated until the impulse which activates it is channeled 
elsewhere. But even the act of channeling an existing habit (especially an 
ingrained one) is one of the aspects of human nature that is subject to 
modification, and therefore reconstructable. This is particularly frustrating when 
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the habits which exist are designed specifically to thwart or defuse needs and 
impulses which are native. These unhealthy habits, though acquired, do injustice 
to the individuals who have acquired them. 
And while “[i]t is hard to teach an old dog new tricks,” Dewey states that “it 
is harder yet to teach society to adopt customs which are contrary to those which 
have long prevailed.”93 The greater the length of time a custom has existed, the 
harder it is to excise the custom from one’s cultural practices. This makes sense 
if cultures are considered as webs of habits rather than simplistic learned 
responses. Dewey held that habits could not possibly be the over-simplified 
operant conditioning discussed by behavioral psychology of his day because so 
much changed from situation to situation that a host of other habits would also 
have to be in operation and working in tangent in order for any one of them to 
operate. In effect, operant conditioning works primarily because experience is of 
a field and judgment is capable of discrimination. 
The fact that habits are acquired, and that most of human behavior 
operates by way of habits, points to an important aspect of Dewey’s political 
views. Different habits than currently exist can be inculcated into the young by 
way of education to bring about societal behavior different than our own. While 
Dewey is often painted as an ameliorative philosopher, and that this is largely 
true for how he recommended conflict resolution among those who currently walk 
the earth, I believe his educational reform amounts to radicalism when the 
implications are considered. Dewey held that if we could determine, 
experimentally by way of laboratory schools, which customs and habits best 
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promoted the protean but creative nature of humanity that we could promote 
human flourishing. It was his conception that fostering creative problem solving 
by way of education in methods of inquiry and experimentation alongside 
promoting practices which forged new paths of growth would lead to cultural 
practices which he labeled democratic.94 
Culture as Communal 
Philosophers are tasked with discerning those practices which not only 
vary widely in different cultural mediums, but also promote equilibrium, harmony 
and growth. As Dewey phrased it, “[t]he problem is to know what kind of culture 
is so free in itself that is conceives and begets political freedom as its 
accompaniment and consequence.”95 This culture, whatever its form may take, 
likely can not be found among the existing cultures as political freedom is only 
had sparingly and selectively in existing societies. While specific countries96 may 
experience to a degree the political freedom Dewey is discussing here, it may be 
attributable to accident and contingency rather than to an operation of the 
culture. 
Dewey did not hold freedom to be a “god-given right” or even a natural 
right. The brute existence of slavery, the enslavement of humanity to the needs 
and wants of a tiny minority and the enslavement of humans to their own desires 
are but examples that freedom must be achieved rather than assumed. While 
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formulation of a set of customs and habits which would promote this freedom has 
been theoretically formulated, the achievability of them is still a cultural project 
left unfinished. 
Since Dewey held habits as mutable and unfixed, and that individual’s 
habits are shaped by their culture and education, and further still that habits 
either achieve or frustrate native needs and desires, Dewey’s project for 
describing the great community hinged upon finding how to adjust each of these 
variables in such a way that they promote the cultural transmission of habits and 
customs which best promotes individual growth. Dewey continually maintained 
this cultural project could be achieved in part by way of the key-holders to cultural 
transmission, education: 
In progressive communities they endeavor to shape the 
experiences of the young so that instead of reproducing 
current habits, better habits shall be formed, and thus the 
future adult society be an improvement on its own.97 
Here Dewey envisions education not merely as a process of instilling young 
minds with information gleaned by past, but as an unfolding process which better 
equips the young for encountering situations as yet not conceived. In a 
contemporary setting, this can be a rather complicated affair: there are typically 
elected officials, school boards, administrators, staff, teachers, unions, parents 
and students involved in the process. No one aspect of this process is solely 
responsible for the activity of education, and blame should not rest exclusively on 
any single element for failures of cultural growth. When variables are changed in 
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complex situations it is sometimes difficult to tell what the specific effect of that 
given variable is due in part to the context of other variables and in part to the 
unscientific nature of education. 
The solution Dewey offered was to more fully integrate inquiry, 
experimentation and scientific methodologies into the matrix of education. By 
identifying variables and, whenever possible, isolating them, then their effects are 
more easily identified. Even were an entirely scientific school developed, similar 
to Dewey’s own laboratory school, the effects of political endeavors can not be 
ignored. This lesson is painful in light of the political powers which complicated 
Dewey’s own experience in this area.98 As long as governments play a role in 
educational practices, educational experimentation will always yield to political 
power. As long as politicians are beholden to their constituents, such as is the 
case in contemporary America, in effect the schools will be beholden to cultural 
forces, especially those very forces the educational experimentation is attempting 
to change. Integral to individual growth is education, but communication is the 
median by which education is transmitted and is one of the six conditions 
required for the formation of a community. 
Institutions which Foster Individual Growth 
Drift is one of the single largest enemies that Dewey’s cultural project 
came into conflict with. He promoted the use of intelligent inquiry to isolate and 
find resolution to the problems facing humans, but the more he promoted this 
agenda, the more he came to realize that customs and habits die hard. The 
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mindset which holds that continuing to pursue a course solely because this is the 
course that has been pursued for decades, or even centuries, is a difficult 
mindset to change. The goal of a given practice is often subsumed to the bare 
fact that this practice has taken deep root in the traditions of the culture or 
people. Traditions provide emotional stability even while they may be the culprit 
for bringing about environmental problematic situations. Such is currently the 
case with the use of fossil fuels to power tools and implements which bring about 
infrastructural stability, provide clean water, grow food and transport essential 
supplies to distant places. 
These tools and implements, themselves cultural practices, are subject to 
criticism in their use and expression. But similar to recalcitrant cultural customs, 
our tools are slow to change as well. While Dewey was not aware of the 
environmental devastation occurring by way of the tools of the industrial 
revolution, he was painfully aware of the cultural upheaval they had borne. It is 
my contention that Dewey would have recommended as radical an overhaul of 
our machines as he had recommended for our culture had he been aware of the 
consequences of their use. 
Social institutions such as education provide one inlet for possible change 
of cultural and mechanical use. Rather than idealizing the state or government as 
the height of human achievement as some philosophers did, Dewey believed 
these were institutions that should be brought to bear upon human concerns 
rather than forcing humans to curtail to ingrained institutional drift. Dewey stated 
that 
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it is true that social arrangements, laws, institutions are 
made for men, rather than that man is made for them; that 
they are means and agencies of human welfare and 
progress. But they are not means for obtaining something for 
individuals, not even happiness. They are means of creating 
individuals.99 
Dewey maintained that institutions are primarily oriented toward the future; while 
individuals may corrupt and misdirect the energies of these institutions toward 
their personal gain; despite this the institutions function to create individuals. 
What short-sighted and self-interested individuals do not notice, or do not care 
about, is that once the institutions are directed toward the promotion of a narrow 
set of individuals rather than toward the bulk of humanity, they still operate upon 
the bulk of humanity. When laws are crafted to benefit the wealthy and punish 
those without wealth, these laws certainly do benefit those with pecuniary gifts 
but they create situations that act as environing conditions for the next 
generation. 
Realization of the great community will be hindered until cultural 
institutions are oriented toward the welfare of the individuals they are producing 
and toward fostering ways of living which promote inquiry and participation. 
Pecuniary practices and power politics distract energies of these institutions 
away from the goal of fostering democratic ways of life, and will continue to do so 
until measures are taken to limit the influence of power and wealth upon 
institutions of education. Until steps such as these are taken, the achievability of 
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the great community will continue to remain on-hold, and out of reach. One in-
road to better fostering a democratic way of life is to inculcate the habits of 
inquiry into the young and reconstruct the habits of those more set in their ways 
until they have inquiry and participation as their base-line way of life. 
 65 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Habits 
This chapter will explore the following works by Dewey: The Public and its 
Problems, Democracy and Education, Experience and Education, Freedom and 
Culture and Logic: the Theory of Inquiry but primarily Human Nature and 
Conduct. 
Were cultural institutions focused upon the development of individuals 
rather than self-interests of an elite few, the fulcrum for change would be the 
cultivation of habits. Cultural institutions operate by transmitting habits to 
generations of individuals who are normally endowed with capabilities in 
communication. Therefore habits stand as the primary vehicle of culture and the 
medium for tradition. Habits are commonly conceived of either as passive 
instruments laying in wait, such as “walking, playing a musical instrument, 
typewriting,” or as active powers which overcome our conscious awareness, as 
in the case of “foolish idling, gambling, addiction to liquor and drugs.”100 Dewey 
believed each of these were habits but only told, at best, half of the story. The 
fuller story is that habits are not just a part of us, they do not merely contribute to 
our being who it is that we are; the case is far more serious than that. Dewey put 
it bluntly when he stated that “we are the habit.” So thoroughly are we composed 
of habits that Dewey stated “[m]an is a creature of habits, not of reason nor yet of 
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instinct.”101 Even when we utilize reason and instinct, we do so by way of 
habitudes. The fact that “bad” habits aren’t formed consciously (at least not by 
most people), or that these habits formed over periods of time rather than by acts 
of will of choice indicates that “all habits are affections, that all have projectile 
power, and that a predisposition formed by a number of specific acts is an 
immensely more intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than are vague, 
general, conscious choices.”102 
In short, habits are the very fabric of our being, not ornaments added on 
after the fact. Additionally, habits are formed and can be reconstructed, thus 
reinforcing the conclusion drawn in Chapter Three that while human nature is 
fixed, its fixity is protean. This protean nature is habitudes. Dewey defined habits 
as “(1) that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that 
sense acquired; (2) which contains within itself a certain ordering or 
systematization of minor elements of action; (3) which is projective, dynamic in 
quality, ready for overt manifestation; and (4) which is operative in some subdued 
subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity.”103 Each of these 
aspects of habits will be explored within this chapter. 
Habit formation 
Humans are beings capable of forming habits and the process of habit 
formation is referred to as learning. Dewey did not mince words when discussing 
the importance of habit learning when he said that “[t]he influence of habit is 
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decisive because all the distinctively human action has to be learned, and the 
very heart, blood and sinews of learning is creation of habitudes.”104 As was 
discussed in Chapter Two, the outcome of a controlled inquiry can result in a 
warranted assertion, but what was left unsaid was the relationship between 
inquiry and habits. A consummated inquiry can become integrated as a habit. 
When this is done, the habit of learning is already half-formed. 
It is granted that habits can be acquired by emulation of the actions of 
adults or individuals in power. Dewey referred to habits formed in this way as 
“training” rather than “education” because training ignores cultivating 
“independent judgment” and “inventive initiation.”105 The differences are 
enormous: in training, habits are formed as exactly as possible to the mold and 
conformity is expected. The emphasis upon authority and following orders is 
obvious and overt. In education, habits of inquiry are cultivated; judgment and 
initiative are a matter of utilization of inquiry to overcome problematic situations 
rather than reliance upon customs. By having encountered a problematic 
situation in the first place custom proves itself incapable of overcoming it; were 
customs enough to ensure continued harmony, no problematic situations would 
arise outside of instances where traditions were not followed. But in the case 
where traditions are followed and problems still arise, inquiry is preferred to 
merely attempting “tried and true” methods in the face of their failure. Here 
emphasis is placed upon integrating the novel and unusual into one’s stock and 
trade rather than looking to people of power for instruction. 
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Habit formation is therefore of the utmost societal importance but habits 
are also intractable for all of their malleability. Dewey was keenly aware of this 
when he stated that 
Any one with knowledge of the stability and force of habit will 
hesitate to propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping social 
changes. A social revolution may effect abrupt and deep 
alterations in external customs, in legal and political 
institutions. But the habits that are behind those institutions 
and that have, willy-nilly, been shaped by objective 
conditions, the habits of thought and feelings, are not so 
easily modified.106 
This statement by Dewey is often overlooked by those who turn to Dewey for 
social radicalism. Dewey was interested in progress, but he wasn’t foolish 
enough to believe it could be accomplished rapidly. He was aware that habits of 
thought are different, and in many ways more foundational, than habits of 
actions. Examples of habits of thought which are more foundational than overt 
habits of action include modes of thinking which are paranoid, fearful, distrustful 
and self-serving; even in a setting potentially capable of becoming a community; 
if these habits persist then actions of sharing and caring will take no root. Habits 
of action can be shaped and adapted by overt force, but habits of thought persist. 
If the only reform enacted is upon the habits of action little more has been 
accomplished than a “muscular trick.” But it should also be admitted that habits of 
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thought are in large part affected by environing conditions, including the habits of 
others: 
The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience 
enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and 
undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it 
or not, the quality of subsequent experiences. For it is a 
somewhat different person who enters into them.107 
Regardless of how tenaciously certain individuals maintain their habits of 
thought, if they enter into regular social interplay with others whom are different 
than themselves, the eventual erosion of their “steadfast” belief is inevitable. But 
even buried habits die hard. 
All that has been said begs a single question: just how is it that habits are 
formed, or re-formed? Mead criticized Dewey for falling “back too much upon the 
outworn doctrine of imitation, and for this reason he has no satisfactory account 
of the arising of the self in conduct.”108 It should be noted on Dewey’s behalf that 
imitation is but one process for habit acquisition, and not even a particularly 
intelligent one at that. Habits are formed, in part, whenever needs are satiated. 
This fact is partially responsible for the formation of bad habits and “magical” 
thinking. For instance, an action is taken virtually at random and afterward the 
consequence sought is obtained. In future situations it is a rare individual who will 
not recourse to attempting the random action a second time in hopes of it 
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succeeding again; if this happens more than a few times. Almost certainly a habit 
will form. 
But this only tells a portion of the story as there are other means to form 
habits beyond mere imitation; the means Dewey most ardently promoted was the 
utilization of intelligently directed inquiry, but even he admitted that the habit of 
learning is but one more habit to be acquired. Habits which are formed by blind 
groping, “magical” thinking and rote imitation are unintelligent and stifle future 
growth insofar as they do little to nothing to prepare the individual for instances 
when they are challenged and their habits fail them. Therefore Dewey steadfastly 
promoted the use of inquiry as the basis for habit formation. When a problematic 
situation is resolved by means of inquiry the individual is equipped with a 
warranted assertion. Warranted assertions are fallible and subject to revision, but 
the more careful the inquiry, the less likely revision will be needed in the near 
future. The important difference between groping and inquiry hinges upon the 
use of deliberation, judgment and experimentation in the determination of what 
course to take. 
Habit re-formation, what Dewey called habit reconstruction, is a different 
issue. Once a habit is formed it is very difficult to ever rid oneself entirely of it. 
The best course of action, according to Dewey, is to consider the end result, or 
goal, of the habit in question. Does the habit, in fact, accomplish this goal? If it 
does, re-construction is either merely aesthetical or whimsical, but probably not 
necessary. But if the habit fails to accomplish its goal, then the habit is frustrating 
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the very need it is supposed to sate; this is a case where reconstruction is either 
wanted or necessary. 
To reconstruct a habit requires that first conscious hesitancy be employed; 
the habit must be short-circuited by means of thought. In brief, the individual 
must think before they act. Once the habit’s dynamo is suspended then the 
individual can either recourse to magical thinking and blind groping or can 
engage in inquiry. If the individual engages in inquiry, the consummation of that 
inquiry should satisfy the need and will go a short way toward eroding the earlier 
habit.109 Continual recourse to the consummation of this inquiry, rather than 
falling back into a mechanical response which does not sate the need, will 
continue to weaken the initial habit until one day the consummation will be the 
habit. This process may take a great deal of time or, in the case of life-
threatening habits, it may take a great deal of attention but a rather short amount 
of time. It is highly unlikely that a non-life threatening habit will erode quickly. 
An important omission in Dewey’s description of habit reconstruction is 
mere repetition. Repetition alone is the least likely path to habit reconstruction 
because “repetition is in no sense the essence of habit.”110 Dewey maintained his 
belief that repetition was a consequence of a formed habit rather than the path to 
its formation and he said as much when he stated 
Ability to repeat is a result of a formation of a habit through 
the organic predispositions effected by attainment of a 
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consummatory close. This modification is equivalent to 
giving some definite direction of future actions. As far as 
environing conditions remain much the same, the resulting 
act will look like a repetition of a previously performed act. 
But even then repetition will not be exact as far as conditions 
differ. Sheer repetition is, in the case of the human 
organism, the product of conditions that are uniform because 
they have been made so mechanically – as in much school 
and factory ‘work.’ Such habits are limited in their 
manifestation to the rather artificial conditions in which they 
operate. They certainly do not provide the model upon which 
a theory of habit formation and operation should be 
framed.111 
This stands, in part, as equal part conclusion and criticism. It is a conclusion 
insofar as Dewey determines that habits are not the consequence of repetition 
but rather the source of repeatability. It stands as criticism of existing school and 
factory work insofar as they promote narrow-minded habit formation which is so 
mechanical in its formulation that it is useless outside of artificially constrained 
environments. If trends in future jobs remain consistent this criticism remains a 
problematic situation for existing universal education regimes because the 
majority of the jobs that graduates will work in do not yet exist. An education 
system that promotes inquiry methodology and adaptive skills of critical thinking 
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acquisition is far better suited than one of mechanical training in artificial 
conditions. 
Action as Habits in Operation 
Habits are the organic means to satisfying native needs and impulses. But 
they are also ends insofar as character is composed of a system of habits. While 
habits operate as means, they can either aid the organism in accomplishing its 
goals or they hinder the accomplishment of its goals. In themselves habits are 
blind to their consequences. They are powers which can be drawn upon or which 
well-up unbidden, but in isolation habits are not informed. Of this Dewey stated 
that “habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think, observe 
or remember.”112 Thought is also the result of habit since thought is but another 
action taken by humans. Habits operate unconsciously only when they are 
“suavely efficient.”113 Otherwise a certain amount of direction, forethought or 
intelligent reaction is required. 
Individuals who operate solely based upon habitual response act 
mechanically, and usually poorly, in situations; they have become closer to 
robots than humans. Dewey stated that “the routineer’s road is the ditch out of 
which he can not get, whose sides enclose him, directing his course so 
thoroughly that he no longer thinks of his path or his destination.”114 The walls of 
routine have become so high as to be virtually insurmountable. These individuals 
act without thinking but not in a sense that is vital and flexible; rather they act 
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without thinking because even thinking has become encapsulated so deeply by 
the ingrained mechanical responses. People who have “attained” such a degree 
of mechanization are unsettled by any derivation of routine and the novel 
becomes a source of deep disquiet. 
Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or 
degenerate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just 
in the degree in which intelligence is disconnected from them 
… the acquiring of habits is due to an original plasticity of our 
natures: to our ability to vary responses till we find an 
appropriate and efficient way of acting. Routine habits, and 
habits that possess us instead of our possessing them, are 
habits which put an end to plasticity.115 
Routine habit therefore can stand as an obstacle to growth insofar as it ends the 
plasticity of responses the organism possesses. When plasticity is cut off, the 
organism is ensuring eventual disharmony unless the environment is artificially 
maintained to suit just and only the organism’s habitual responses. This may be 
an option for situations of medical or mental care but becomes too cumbersome 
for any individual organism to maintain on its own by way of mere routine. Dewey 
held as a basic supposition that existence is precarious. No amount of routine 
habitual response will ever adequately acclimate the individual to the environing 
conditions because those environing conditions are subject to variety and 
change. 
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The short-sighted method which falls back on mechanical 
routine and repetition to secure external efficiency of habit, 
motor skill without accompanying thought, marks a 
deliberate closing in of surroundings upon growth.116 
Those educational systems which operate largely or entirely on the level of blind 
and routine acquisition of habits are therefore cutting off the possibility of 
flexibility in such a way as to stunt growth. Because of the importance currently 
placed upon training students to take standardized tests, it should be no surprise 
that the educational system of the United States is failing in such a spectacular 
fashion when it is recognized that the goal of this system is effectively to 
enshroud the student in routine. Unless drastic changes in this system are 
implemented, the possibility of the great community emerging in the United 
States approaches zero. 
But action, brought about by habit, can originate by way of either routine 
or intelligence. In the case of intelligence, the action can either be one of 
forethought or contemplative reaction. If the action is the result of careful 
forethought, it will appear as if the action occurred with no thought at all. In the 
heat of the moment, this will, to some degree, be true. The thinking occurred 
prior to the event and determined that if conditions of a specific sort ever arose 
then specific actions would be required to deal with it. In the case of 
contemplative reaction, the situation is reversed. In contemplative reaction there 
is a lag between when action is heeded as necessary and when action is taken; 
this lag is the time needed for the individual to determine the course of action 
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best suited to the situation; in a word it is contemplation and conceiving of ends 
to pursue. Because no prior thinking occasioned the individual to consider a 
situation just so, they must engage in deliberation to call forth a habit already 
existent to deal with the situation or inquire into what needs to be done; past 
structured energies must be channeled to new situations. 
Habits and Potentialities 
While it may appear odd that the potential nature of habits is explored 
after their active capability, this is close to Dewey’s own handling of the situation: 
Habits as organized activities are secondary and acquired, 
not native and original. They are outgrowths of unlearned 
activities which are part of man’s endowment at birth. In 
conduct the acquired is the primitive. Impulses although first 
in time are never primary in fact; they are secondary and 
dependent. Even if by some miracle original activity could 
continue without assistance from the organized skill and art 
of adults, it would not amount to anything. It would be mere 
sound and fury.”117 
The native and inborn purposive activity is primary in the sense that it is present 
before the existence of any habit that could satisfy it. But habits are acquired and 
not native; so to speak they come “after the fact” when compared to native 
purposiveness. But in the moment of action, habits are primary in that the 
structured impulse of the past is the acting force. 
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Habit Reconstruction 
Impulses may be the source of novelty, but as soon as they well up they 
are beholden to the existing habits of the individual and those habits act either 
mechanically, intelligently or by way of drift. In this way habit and impulse act 
opposed to one another, but “[h]abit and impulse may war with each other, but it 
is a combat between the habits of adults and the impulses of the young, and not, 
as with the adult, a civil warfare whereby personality is rent asunder.”118 The war 
between habit and impulse is rarely within a single individual. Far more often it 
manifests as a war between the impulse of those whose habits are not yet 
formed and those whose habits are crystallized. When this conflict occurs within 
a single individual, there is a dire need for reconstruction of habits. This 
reconstruction Dewey calls education.119 
The Transmission of Habits 
Habits are transmitted primarily by way of communication. Even imitation 
is a form of communication insofar as the one being mimicked is transmitting the 
act to mimic. But this is a shallow form of communication which is, at best, one 
way. The important aspect of communication is not just how communication 
occurs, but rather what is transmitted in the communication: 
Society exists through a process of transmission quite as 
much as biological life … Society not only continues to exist 
by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said 
to exist in transmission, in communication. There is more 
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than a verbal tie between the words common, community, 
and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the 
things which they have in common; and communication is 
the way in which they come to possess things in common. 
What they must have in common in order to form a 
community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, 
knowledge—a common understanding — like-mindedness 
as the sociologists say. Such things cannot be passed 
physically from one to another, like bricks; they cannot be 
shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into 
physical pieces. The communication which insures 
participation in a common understanding is one which 
secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions — like 
ways of responding to expectations and requirements.120 
Community exists in communication and therefore transmission can be thought 
of as community in a verb-form. Language is more than just the tie that binds 
humans to one another in communities; language is the very medium of 
community. Values and dispositions can be communicated, but so can habits 
and traditions. If communication is the medium in which community exists, then 
cultural habits are the muscle in which community affects the world. Unlike the 
pie example Dewey alludes to, where it can only be divided up among so many, 
communication can be spread widely without dilution. Information handed out in 
this way is the true heritage that humans share among one another; it is the only 
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human product which grows with age rather than shriveling beneath the weight of 
time, but the very transmission of these beliefs, aspirations, aims and knowledge 
can itself be a habitude. 
One of the largest problems humanity faces in the transmission of cultural 
values and traditions is stagnation and drift. Just because values are transmitted 
from the distant past does not mean they continue to knit communities together, 
or that they still function in the role they originally developed to fill. Ideals can be 
as much of a hindrance to community life as they can be the very lifeblood of it. 
When Copernicus worked out the mathematical system to prove Aristarchus’ 
heliocentric system, this finding cut deeply into the existing social traditions which 
were, in part, founded upon a geocentric model. By challenging this deeply held 
belief, Copernicus was fighting against not just adherents to an astronomical 
model, but to the very currents of culture. This esoteric conclusion marked the 
declaration of a culture-war of sorts: those who continued to hold the belief that 
the earth was the center of the solar system had more than just an astronomical 
prediction to uphold; they were conserving a cultural matrix, of which geo-
centrism was but a part. Even in the face of rigorous mathematical proofs and 
astronomical observations, the weight and resistance of tradition refused to 
accept the findings. This example stands as a reminder that Dewey was right in 
determining habit as the recalcitrant aspect of human nature. This example also 
demonstrates the great wealth of culture that is transmitted from generation to 
generation; Aristarchus declared the sun the center of the solar system, and it 
took nearly two millennia for mathematical proofs to accord with this finding. 
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Generations of mathematicians conserved and transmitted this before it could 
challenge then established ideals. Charles Darwin himself admits the great debt 
he owed to Aristotle’s biological work, even as he criticized specific components 
of it. 
Likewise, just because something is new and original does not perforce 
mean it is better than a traditional value. The value of value, so to speak, is 
whether the custom in question is capable of accomplishing the good or end it is 
directed toward. Determining which and how to transmit values is therefore of the 
utmost importance to social order. If values are adhered to just because they are 
traditional and antiquated then society is stagnant. Conversely if progress is 
sought just for its novelty and not for its capability, then society is adrift. As 
Dewey said, “[w]hen customs are flexible and youth is educated as youth and not 
as premature adulthood, no nation grows old.”121 Not only are individuals more 
capable when educated to be “flexible” with their customs, but individuals 
working together benefit as well. Once the Church’s choke-hold on the 
transmission and clarification of values came to an end, science experienced a 
rebirth that had never been witnessed in the whole of recorded history. The 
tenacity of individuals like Galileo Galilei who pursued knowledge, even when it 
differed radically from the accepted conclusions of his day, should be celebrated 
as heroes. The very fact that individuals pursued knowledge of this sort in the 
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face of death should demonstrate its value, for “the best measure we have of 
what is valued is the effort spent in its behalf.”122 
Habits constitute the web of actions and beliefs which define a culture. 
Traditions are transmitted by way of languages, themselves traditions of 
communication, to future generations, and communities are composed of 
overlapping cultures of communication. Because of the great diversity of human 
behavior brought about by the multitude of cultures, it is inevitable that 
communities will come into conflict over values. What determines whether these 
communities can come together to form a community of communities, the great 
community, is whether these communities have flexible enough individuals that 
habits can be reconstructed to better accommodate alterity. The more inflexible a 
community is, the less inclusive its habitudes are towards alterity. The more 
flexible a community is, the more inclusive its members will be toward ways of life 
different than their own. 
                                                 
122 Dewey, John. Freedom and Culture, p. 17. 
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Chapter Five: Education, Freedom and Growth 
This chapter will utilize the following works by Dewey: Art as Experience, 
A Common Faith, The Public and its Problems, Human Nature and Conduct, 
Individualism Old and New, Reconstruction in Philosophy but primarily 
Experience and Education. 
Flexibility of communities is based upon the habitudes of its individual 
constituents where knowledge, human nature, habit acquisition and culture fuse 
in the act of education. Education therefore stands as the determining factor of 
habitude flexibility and each of these elements plays a vital and necessary part in 
the process of community formation. The habits of the teacher act as delimiting 
boundaries and are transmitted to the learner in the form of cultural acquisition. 
Past knowledge of the learner accumulates to make possible the educative 
experience of the present; the new experience allows for further clarification of 
past knowledge by way of reflection and relation to new contexts. Past and 
present knowledge is utilized by the learner to project future consequences and 
engage their environment. The process of education is, in effect, one sustained 
habit reconstruction brought about by way of thinking and ideally aimed at 
obtaining a harmonious balance between organisms and environment. 
This habit reconstruction is called growth by Dewey and translates into an 
expansion of habits. To this effect Dewey stated that 
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The only freedom that is of enduring importance is the 
freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of 
observation and of judgment, exercised in behalf of 
purposes that are intrinsically worth while. The commonest 
mistake made about freedom is, I think, to identify it with 
freedom of movement, or, with the external or physical side 
of activity.123 
He held that the more education an individual has, the more capable that 
individual is at observing and judging and therefore more capable of successfully 
navigating novel situations, thus making the individual “more free.” Intellectual 
freedom without physical freedom is little more than fantasy, but physical 
freedom without intellectual freedom is little more than mental enslavement. 
Almost more than anywhere else, freedom of thought is needed in educational 
situations to better habituate individuals to independent thought if they are to 
become members of the great community. Equally important, the individual must 
be willing to reconstruct habits which prove to be unhelpful, stagnant or 
dangerous. If an individual is unwilling to reconstruct unruly habits, they act as a 
possible jeopardy to themselves and others.  
Culture as cumulative 
Culture is as much an environment for humans as is their spacio-temporal 
surroundings. Because culture is such an influential aspect of human experience, 
it can either be the chain that binds or it can be the key to enduring freedom. 
Humans are not born into a cultural vacuum and do not develop their culture 
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alone. Instead, humans are born into complex cultural structures that overlap and 
occasionally conflict with one another. But no human acts as the sole, or even 
dominant, adapter of their cultural environment. 
As the developing growth of an individual from embryo to 
maturity is the result of interaction of organism with 
surroundings, so culture is the product not of efforts of men 
put forth in a void or just upon themselves, but of prolonged 
and cumulative interaction with environment.124 
Dewey here makes a close linkage between the acquiring of habits by an 
individual as analogous to the accumulation of culture by a civilization. Due to the 
organic emphasis to Dewey’s theory of experience, the matrix of experience that 
is culture necessarily also is a transaction between organisms and environment, 
but on a scale of magnitude larger than the focus of the individual. 
The fact that human culture is cumulative has multiple philosophic 
implications. To begin, culture represents the true human heritage. Even when 
cultures have long since disappeared, their legacy lives on. The mathematical 
and scientific findings of the Egyptian dynasties survive their demise and 
continue to be vital and active habitudes in the lives of millions. While the 
monolithic Pyramids constructed by this same civilization exists as well, they 
have become little more than an assortment of ornaments showcasing the 
physical existence of a people who have long since disappeared. The 
philosophic advances made by Greek philosophers have continued to shape the 
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political formulation of civilizations and have acted as the ember for the 
Renaissance and Enlightenment. 
But the longevity of these cultural practices and values are found in their 
ability to combine and multiply in new habits and customs. Were the values of 
these civilizations constrained to just what and how they were originally utilized, 
they would likely have long since been fossilized and referred to in the same way 
as baubles found in museums. Instead, these values and beliefs have acted as 
threads to be woven into new and interesting practices. Geometric mathematics 
has morphed into a form that would be virtually unrecognizable to Euclid, yet his 
theorems continue to be used to the current day. 
The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. 
They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the 
continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is 
the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and 
expanding the heritage of values we have received that 
those who come after us may receive it more solid and 
secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared 
than we have received it.125 
The heritage of values which we are to transmit to those who come after us are 
threads inherited from previous cultures and must be conserved, rectified and 
expanded upon or they cease to be of importance and use. All human progress 
that has occurred has built upon the foundation laid by those that came before. 
                                                 
125 Dewey, John. A Common Faith, LW 9.58. This quotation is found on the headstone of 
John Dewey in Burlington, Vermont. 
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Dewey is likewise recommending that we continue the process whose fruit we 
cherish in order that those who follow us may do the same, perhaps even in a 
more accessible manner. 
Newton claimed he stood upon the shoulders of giants, so too do all 
humans stand upon the giants of the past, but it should not be forgotten that 
Dewey also tasked us with clarifying these values; we are not to pass on the 
values of the past as a creed or dogma, but rather as critical recipients. If 
criticism and clarification of these values is accomplished then a culture grows 
and thrives according to how well the criticism and clarification translates to a 
harmonious balance with existential and natural forces. To the extent that values 
are handed down and dogmatically followed then they become mechanical and 
inevitable disintegration ensues. To this effect Dewey stated that “[c]reation, not 
acquisition, is the measure of a nation’s rank; it is the only road to an enduring 
place in the memory of mankind.”126 Dewey more often called creation by the 
term reconstruction, or utilizing the materials and ideas of the past to build 
something anew. In the act of reconstruction, even the oldest traditions remain 
vital and new. 
Education and Culture 
In light of the implications and necessity of cultural growth for the 
continued life of society, the importance of education is therefore enormous.127 I 
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127 Those with a communistic bent are inclined to recommend revolution as the means by 
which concrete conditions should be changed to accommodate new socio-economic 
environments. Dewey would disagree substantially with this view as it would do little to nothing to 
change the underlying habits of individuals. Therefore rather than advocating revolution as a 
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wish to re-iterate a point made in Chapter IV whereby education was 
differentiated from training: education is a preparation for the unknown, not just 
an instilment of the known. Dewey stressed the importance of equipping students 
with capabilities rather than factoids; he held that 
knowledge is a function of association and communication; it 
depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially 
transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Faculties of effectual 
observation, reflection and desire are habits acquired under 
the influence of the culture and institutions of society, not 
ready-made inherent powers.128 
If knowledge is understood as operational rather than static, and as guiding 
rather than fixed, then education can be said to be a transmission of habits of 
thinking, reflecting and hypothesizing. The “copy theory” mentioned in Chapter II, 
whereby knowledge is as exact as possible in mirroring reality, holds education 
to be direct and exact transmission of knowledge to the next generation. 
Education of this manner inculcates individuals toward passivity and 
acquiescence toward figures of authority, for they possess the exact knowledge 
of the past. Any society which holds freedom and liberty as values, and not as 
mere lip-service, will abhor education situations that demand passivity and 
                                                                                                                                                 
means (usually violent in nature) for overcoming problematic situations, Dewey recommends 
education as a means of social change. Though gradual, insofar as educational reform affects the 
generation to come rather than the existing one, Dewey held educational reform to be a means 
consistent with the ends desired; peaceful means beget peaceful ends. 
 
128 Dewey, John. The Public and its Problems, p. 158. 
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acquiescence of the learner, for these systems limit intellectual freedom rather 
than foster it. 
Different conceptions of liberty will contribute to objections at this point. 
Those who hold liberty to be the absence of obstacles will differ in acceptance or 
rejection of this theory of education from those who view liberty positively as an 
accumulation of ability. Dewey was critical of merely negative freedom saying 
that 
Liberty does not mean the removal of the checks which 
nature and man impose on the life of every individual in the 
community, so that one individual may indulge impulses 
which go against his own welfare as a member of society. 
But liberty for the child is the chance to test all impulses and 
tendencies on the world of things and people in which he 
finds himself, sufficiently to discover their character so that 
he may get rid of those which are harmful, and develop 
those which are useful to himself and others 129 
Here Dewey’s conception of freedom shows through. Merely negative freedom is 
criticized for cultivating citizens who may eventually develop habits and indulge 
impulses which are ultimately harmful to himself or others (even if only indirectly 
by way of example). Instead Dewey views freedom as the ability to test and 
experiment to find those tendencies which are harmful, and to rid oneself of 
them, but also to find those which are healthy and to embrace them. Members of 
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a community are not isolated atoms; their doings transact with other members 
and their actions have ramifications which ripple beyond consequences to 
themselves. Individuals within communities utilize freedom and come to hold as 
valuable certain traditions, but not all communities share the same values. As 
potential members of a great community, individuals must be flexible in pursuing 
those habits which bring about harmony and equilibrium with environing 
situations; it is the only hope for a sustainable community. 
Because different communities hold different values it is of utmost 
importance for the community of communities, the great community, to be 
capable of acclimating to multiple different value systems simultaneously. Dewey 
takes it as a bare reality that diversity of value is the consequence of culture: 
How is the tremendous diversity of institutions (including 
moral codes) to be accounted for? The native stock of 
instincts is practically the same everywhere. Exaggerate as 
much as we like the native differences of Patagonians and 
Greeks, Sioux Indians and Hindoos (sic.), Bushmen and 
Chinese, their original differences will hear no comparison to 
the amount of difference found in custom and culture.130 
Given that there is diversity of values, and given that the diversity exists in 
cultural mediums, not within human nature, the path for conflict resolution is the 
utilization of inquiry to overcome the problems faced and reconstruct culture. 
Once values are reconstructed to draw communities together, the primary 
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method for transmitting these reconstructed values is through communicative 
education: 
I believe that education is a regulation of the process of 
coming to share in the social consciousness; and that the 
adjustment of individual activity on the basis of this social 
consciousness is the only sure method of social 
reconstruction.131 
This uncovers one of Dewey’s assumptions about the great community: those 
communities that will be willing to adopt new traditions, in the effort to better 
acclimate to neighboring communities, will be able to enter the great community; 
those unwilling will not. On a large scale, this is like viewing individuals. Those 
willing to work with one another can take part in conjoint endeavors while those 
unwilling can, at best, be forced into compliance, but never really enter as willing 
participants. The fulcrum of change is education, not salvation. 
Education as Growing 
The term growth, like many of Dewey’s terms, has a mainstream cultural 
meaning that is close to Dewey’s own, but he has adapted it to fit within his open-
ended system in a divergent way. Growth, for Dewey, is a term which captures 
moral, educational, political and aesthetic elements and goes beyond merely 
biological contexts, although it includes them. The growth which Dewey is 
conceptualizing is an intellectual growth, one that captures an individual’s 
increased ability to handle new and difficult situations that arise by way of a stock 
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of warranted assertions and habits of inquiry and learning. Growth therefore 
stands as the central concern for matters of education and 
the function of education is to help the growing of a helpless 
young animal into a happy, moral, and efficient human 
being, a consistent plan of education must allow enough 
liberty to promote that growth.132 
 The culture which an individual thrives in acts as the soil which will 
cultivate the individual, but in order to fully thrive and flourish, the individual 
needs enough liberty. An important distinction is between unchecked freedom 
and enough freedom. Unchecked freedom gives a plethora of opportunities, 
some rewarding and some fatal, while enough freedom is an attempt to delimit 
the opportunities to primarily those that are rewarding, promote individual 
flourishing, cultivate inquiry and contribute to the well-being of the individual. 
Where this line is drawn is determined by way of controlled inquiry rather than 
allowing for the drift of unchecked freedom. 
 While growth is an ideal, the process which approximates that ideal is an 
engaged one whereby “the educative process can be identified with growth when 
that is understood in terms of the active participle, growing.”133 It is not a stopping 
point, one which can be achieved and finalized, but rather is a moving target. 
Just as a plant is thought to thrive as long as it is growing, so also should the 
habitudes of the individual thought to be thriving only insofar as they are not 
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133 Dewey, John. Experience and Education, p. 36. 
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stagnating. An individual whose habits have calcified ceases to grow and instead 
operates in a mechanical manner. The walls of habits have so enclosed them 
that further development is shut off and life becomes a drudgery of reaction. The 
individual in this case has effectively entered into a habitual stasis and ceases to 
expand their capabilities. 
 Still other individuals expand their capabilities in a narrow focus, but by 
doing so almost ensure that growth will not continue in other manners: 
That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a 
gangster, or as a corrupt politician, cannot be doubted. But 
from the standpoint of growth as education and education as 
growth the question is whether growth in this direction 
promotes or retards growth in general.134 
The gangster, corrupt politician and burglar can cultivate the skills of taking 
advantage of other people, but in so doing they intellectually isolate themselves 
as well. They have decided to only take the fruits of other’s labor rather than 
cultivating for themselves. But the act of isolating oneself in this manner 
necessarily brings its own consequences: by only taking, some of the greatest 
intellectual and cultural growth is cut off, for some of the most rewarding and 
healthy lifestyles can only be achieved as an active, participating community of 
people fostering cultivation as opposed to narrow-mindedly seeking promotion of 
one’s own selfish ends. 
                                                 
134 Dewey, John. Experience and Education, p. 36. 
 93 
Until such time as educational institutions are geared toward promotion of 
growth and flourishing rather than skills training, it is likely that cultural stagnation 
will continue. As Dewey stated: 
If our public-school system merely turns out efficient 
industrial fodder and citizenship fodder in a state controlled 
by pecuniary industry as other schools in other nations have 
turned out efficient cannon fodder, it is not helping to solve 
the problem of building up a distinctive American culture; it is 
only aggravating the problem.135 
In order to break the cycle which relegates the overwhelming majority of 
individuals to live lives of drudgery and to promote healthy co-existence, 
educational systems must orient away from skills training and toward human 
flourishing by way of cultivating intellectual growth. This isn’t to say that skills 
training should not be present in education, only that it must not be the central 
focus. Only when the habit of learning and the habits of inquiry have been 
inculcated into public school curriculum can thriving cultural growth become a 
reality. 
Freedom as Growth of Human Capability 
There is an age old adage that says “give a man a fish and you feed him 
for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” This quote applies 
equally to education as it does to feeding for if you can inculcate the habit of 
learning and the habits of inquiry, an individual will teach themselves for the rest 
of their lives. Enduring freedom is the ability to handle and overcome problematic 
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situations to bring about flourishing equilibrium, and this goal is best 
accomplished when the individual can find novel ways around unforeseen 
problems. True growth, in the sense of ongoing growing, is accomplished when 
an individual no longer requires teachers and becomes instead their own 
teacher. When the ability to hypothesize, research, experiment, and resolve 
situations without the aid of others has been so ingrained as to become second 
nature, then an individual is not hampered by the fetters of traditions and has 
accomplished a stable freedom. When a community of individuals embraces this 
as their culture then problems become stepping stones to the solidification and 
clarification of values rather than stumbling blocks. 
The means by which this feat can be accomplished already exists, if only 
in narrow circles. Motivating students to want to learn stands as the preliminary 
step. This can be accomplished in many ways, but peer pressure stands as one 
of the most effective means of motivation. Distributing the lesson to individual 
students and having them teach one another stands as one of the most effective 
ways to motivate the desire to learn (in order to be able to teach the material, a 
student must first learn it themselves) and creates an atmosphere of cooperation 
insofar as the students learn from each other. This technique is often used in 
upper division higher education seminar classrooms, but need not be restricted 
to just those environments. The orthodox belief is that students prior to that point 
in their intellectual growth are incapable of the feat of teaching another, much 
less of teaching themselves. Insofar as it remains a practice isolated to senior 
undergraduates, it will remain a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even if younger students 
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do not student teach well, the experience of being thrown into the role of taking 
one’s classmate’s education into one’s own hands can be just enough motivation 
for the fires of self-learning to be stoked. 
Granting students the freedom to pursue projects that are related to 
course content, but also of interest, provides fuel for the fire of inquiry by allowing 
personal interest to enter the equation. Once a student finds passion and interest 
in some small aspect of learning then the likelihood of this translating to other 
avenues increases dramatically. However, there is very real problem that drift 
can enter in, whereby merely anecdotal interest drives the research; whatever 
context of content is present must act as a guiding light or students will be unable 
to transition this habit into things unrelated directly to their tastes and interests. 
Said differently, their choice should be allowed to roam, but within the boundaries 
of the context of content. 
To date, the sort of freedom which results has been erratic and 
sporadically distributed across the human population. Luminaries and shining 
beacons of enlightenment stand out from the masses as geniuses and leaders, 
but it was Dewey’s conviction that these individuals had attained something 
which was not unique, only difficult: 
we are given to looking at this and that ‘age’ marked with 
great names and great productivity, while forgetting to ask 
about the roots of the efflorescence. Might it not be argued 
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that the very transitoriness of the glory of these ages proves 
that its causes were sporadic and accidental?136 
There are many variables which must be “just right” in order to allow an individual 
to attain the sort of freedom herein discussed. Nicoli Tessla was able to cast off 
hindering beliefs and ways of thinking about the world in order to release the full 
potential of electricity, not because he was a freak but because he had attained a 
freedom of thought that no law can secure. No amount of political, economic or 
legal freedom can ensure an individual’s potentiality will be released; this is only 
possible through obtaining the right habits, culture, education and acting upon 
them. These things are not birthrights that only a privileged few can possess and 
covet, but have never been sufficiently clarified such that others may fully partake 
in them. Geniuses accomplish these goals by autodidactic pluck and luck; it 
stands as a challenge to clarify the conditions required to bring about this sort of 
on-going growth such that it is a common cultural heritage. Dewey said that: 
Honesty, industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth 
and learning, are not goods to be possessed as they would 
be if they expressed fixed ends to be attained. They are 
directions of change in the quality of experience. Growth 
itself is the only moral ‘end.137 
When growth is the end toward which educational practices and cultural 
traditions aim, only then can a culture which is inherently free bring about the 
release of human potential that has to date been cramped and hindered behind 
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superstition, tradition and ignorance. If, and when, this cultural feat is 
accomplished then a golden age like no other will be experienced by humanity 
and not just enjoyed by a privileged few. 
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Chapter Six: Democracy and the Great Community 
This chapter will focus on the following works by Dewey: Reconstruction in 
Philosophy, Democracy and Education, Individualism Old and New, Art as 
Experience, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry but primarily The Public and its 
Problems and Freedom and Culture. 
In the previous chapter, Dewey’s aim of growth of individuals in cultural 
institutions was recommended. Contemporary cultural institutions are largely, 
although not entirely, operating at the behest of pecuniary interest, especially the 
interests of a wealthy privately educated upper-class that benefits from a public 
educational system that aims to produce docile factory-workers rather than 
participating and critical citizens capable of self-direction. So long as only a small 
fraction of the population benefits from the educational practices, there will be no 
growth in a wide-spread manner, there will be no critical engagement of issues 
and more of the same is all that can be expected. If, however, the recommended 
steps are taken, there stands a chance that individuals can be fostered to 
cultivate their potentiality and become more than mere cogs in a machine beyond 
their understanding. 
Democracy as a way of life 
A culture whose members are inherently free has been a philosophic 
quest as yet unaccomplished in any wide-spread manner. This free culture 
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should be sharply differentiated from political institutions which grant legal 
freedoms to individuals in the form of rights and privileges; legal freedom may be 
direly important for bringing about a free culture, but 
[i]f we want individuals to be free we must see to it that 
suitable conditions exist: - a truism which at least indicates 
the direction in which to look and move. It tells us among 
other things to get rid of the idea that leads us to believe that 
democratic conditions automatically maintain themselves, or 
that they can be identified with fulfillment of prescriptions laid 
down in a constitution.”138 
Those prescriptions which lay down the democratic form of government may well 
bring with it privileges and procedures which contribute a modicum of legal 
freedom, but they do not ensure cultural freedom. Dewey recognized this 
difference between political institutions and cultural practices and called those 
practices which fostered individual freedom by the name of a democratic way of 
life. Case in point, it would likely be difficult to maintain a free lifestyle under a 
totalitarian dictatorship; so thoroughly would a dictatorship instill fear and 
paranoia in the populous that it would be difficult to secure trust and participation 
amongst one’s neighbors. Said differently, there are political arrangements which 
preclude a democratic way of life, but a democratic political arrangement does 
not ensure a democratic way of life. If the conditions are not met to bring about a 
community, then the consequent way of life which is fostered by this community 
is likewise infinitely less likely to appear. Further, if the democratic culture is 
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lacking, the political institution of democracy is likely to suffer from malaise, 
apathy and widespread disinterest. 
Dewey stated that democratic conditions do not automatically maintain 
themselves but instead require conditions be present, otherwise they wither and 
die. These conditions, like the controlled conditions of a scientific experiment, 
require the active shaping of practices. When a collection of individuals ceases to 
participate, regardless of what other conditions exist, the democratic way of life 
ceases as well; when fear and paranoia reign instead of trust and natural 
association, the democratic lifestyle cannot take root. Dewey stated that 
[w]e acted as if our democracy were something that 
perpetuated itself automatically; as if our ancestors had° 
succeeded in setting up a machine that solved the problem 
of perpetual motion in politics. We acted as if democracy 
were something that took place mainly at Washington and 
Albany—or some other state capital—under the impetus of 
what happened when men and women went to the polls 
once a year or so which is a somewhat extreme way of 
saying that we have had the habit of thinking of democracy 
as a kind of political mechanism that will work as long as 
citizens were reasonably faithful in° performing political 
duties.139 
The first problem to overcome is therefore the belief that democracy is a self-
perpetuating umbrella of protection. Once this belief is gotten rid of, it becomes 
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apparent that merely voting is less than sufficient to maintain democratic ideals. 
Placing belief in voting for someone else, who is then acting as a representative, 
shuffles responsibility onto others rather than requiring any real participation on 
the part of the citizenry; it promotes a way of life that is passive, acquiescent and 
irresponsible. There should be no surprise when individuals raised in this 
environment feel powerless and out of control. Case in point, there is widespread 
apathy toward the political machinations even within countries where voting is 
allowed and, at least nominally, in control of selecting candidates for government. 
Democratic Living to Bring About Individual Growth 
The Democratic way of life is one where all of the individuals who make up 
the community in which they are a part feel as if they have a channel toward 
directing the growth of that community and are not merely free-loading from the 
work of others nor slavishly directed toward the interests of the few. 
A society of free individuals in which all, through their own 
work, contribute to the liberation and enrichment of the lives 
of others, is the only environment in which any individual can 
really grow normally to his full stature.140 
Some may feel this is unrealistic, that no three people can ever really share the 
same direction in thought and action, and for individuals who are not a part of the 
same community and who do not share the same values, this is largely true. But 
those individuals who have been cultivated within a value system which they 
share in common, making decisions between them feels natural and easy. If this 
shared value system includes the utilization of careful inquiry to overcome 
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problematic situations, it is even easier to pursue solutions. Granted, agreement 
upon conclusions may be difficult to arrive at, even among scientists, 
nevertheless problem spaces are easier to agree upon, thus increasing the 
likelihood that solutions will be found to concrete problems being faced. 
Dewey states that this requirement, to be both a part of and in part able to 
direct the course of a community, stands as the environing conditions in which an 
individual can “grow normally to his full stature.” 
Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions 
have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and 
to develop the capacities of human individuals without 
respect to race, sex, class or economic status. And this is all 
one with saying that the test of their value is the extent to 
which they educate every individual into the full stature of his 
possibility. Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a 
moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test 
of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall 
be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of 
every member of society.141 
The most important aspect of this quote is the educative value of business, art, 
religion and all social institutions; education is often thought to exist solely in a 
classroom, but for education to be the process of growing, and for growing to 
continue one’s entire life, education can not be constrained to an artificial 
segment of one’s life. All areas, especially those involving consort with other 
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members of one’s community and social settings at large, must be educative. 
These encounters promote one to interrupt existing habits and reconstruct them 
in light of overcoming problems faced in these various arenas. It is in this way 
that cultures do not stagnate, for their citizens are continually re-forging the very 
fabric of the culture in their transactions with one another. But if education means 
only and exclusively what occurs within the confines of buildings called schools, 
and only when led by authority figures called teachers, then leaning is 
constrained to a very narrow window of opportunity, and anyone not given this 
opportunity by definition does not learn. Cultural stagnation is all but guaranteed 
by a paradigm such as this. 
When a culture becomes trapped within the confines of its habits, it slowly 
calcifies and becomes incapable of handling novel situations. This petrifaction of 
habits spells the inevitable decline of that culture unless intervention is had. 
When habit has solidified and is inflexible, the responses to unexpected and 
previously un-encountered situations are either haphazard and groping or 
entrenched in a response which is not overcoming the present ills. Both are 
problematic, in that they are both unlikely to promote movement toward 
resolution, but also because the inflexibility of habit means future problems are 
not likely to be resolved either. Alternate approaches exist as well, such as 
appeal to supernatural entities to solve the problem, but approaches such as 
these are equally unproductive. 
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Since the individual only exists within a cultural and social matrix, the 
habits of the individual are largely forged within the heart of activity of that 
society. 
All communication is like art. It may fairly be said, therefore, 
that any social arrangement that remains vitally social, or 
vitally shared, is educative to those who participate in it. Only 
when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine way 
does it lose its educative power.142 
If cultural and societal habits are calcified, the individual’s are likely to be as well. 
This environment is not conducive to bringing about a healthy mode of living as 
one’s habits must be continually crafted and reconstructed to participate in the 
shifting pattern of democratic life. This is not to say that it is certain any individual 
raised within a stagnant culture will likewise be stagnant, but that the difficulties 
to overcome are so great that it becomes vanishingly unlikely. Conversely, just 
because an individual is raised within a democratic culture does not ensure their 
continued cultivation and growth; conditions are either present or absent, after 
that point it is up the individual to take advantage of the opportunities afforded. 
Additionally, there are more factors than just culture in shaping an individual’s 
state of mind; as Dewey added that “the trend of occupations, the pattern of 
social arrangements, are the finally controlling influences in shaping minds.”143 
The trend of occupations plays a significant role because even if one is raised in 
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a balanced culture, if there are no opportunities for work aside from mindless 
repetitive tasks, the individual will find it difficult to thrive. 
Education Oriented Toward a Democratic Way of Life 
Given that institutions and social arrangement in most part control the 
development of habits; given that when allowed the choice of lifestyles the 
democratic way of life is preferred; it stands to reason that in order to satisfy this 
preference our institutions should promote as widely as possible democratic 
customs and habits. Transparency and participation in the central weavings of 
social institutions and arrangements should be the highest priority for education, 
and yet the institution of education as currently organized is little more than an 
accreditation process or a government funded day-care at for the majority of 
those who flow through its confines. Dewey held this should be unsurprising 
given that: 
Consequently the effective education, that which really 
leaves a stamp on the character and thought, is obtained 
when graduates come to take their part in the activities of 
adult society which put exaggerated emphasis upon 
business and the results of business success. Such an 
education is at best extremely one-sided; it operates to 
create the specialized ‘business mind’ and this, in turn, is 
manifested in leisure as well as in business itself. The one-
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sidedness is accentuated because of the tragic irrelevancy 
of prior schooling to the controlling realities of social life.144 
This is not to say that people should be unconcerned with earning a living; far 
from it. Rather Dewey is here stating that in earning a living, one must orient 
adult activities toward those which include interests beyond the exclusively 
pecuniary and to integrate activities into earning a wage which promote human 
flourishing and growth; this theory is in direct opposition to the arrangement of 
workers as mere cogs in a machine and embraces modes of doing business 
which humanize those who perform them. But the arrangement which views 
citizens as mere workers fully rejects the attitude that “the mental poverty that 
comes from one-sided distortion of mind is ultimately more significant than 
poverty in material goods.”145 In place of a mental poverty, people are given 
opportunity at meager material goods, relegating them to be second or third-rate 
consumers, but not flourishing individuals. 
Poverty of education, even amidst material wealth, is more unjust than the 
converse; at least someone who is hungry but educated can devise and execute 
ways to slack their hunger. But when mental poverty abounds, in the form of 
exclusively profit-orientation, even those who financially benefit the most are only 
further enslaving themselves (and more importantly millions of others) and 
ensuring continued unrest and unhappiness as well as disequilibrium with their 
environmental conditions. The fabulously wealthy may not view themselves as 
slaves, living amidst opulence and power, but their enslavement to their own 
                                                 
144 Dewey, John. Individualism Old and New, pp. 62-3. 
 
145 Dewey, John. Individualism Old and New, p. 63. 
 107 
desires means they more than anyone will not see respite from their prison, 
though a luxurious one. 
One of the only paths out of this poverty is to have educational systems 
provided for the materially impoverished to ensure they are not likewise 
educationally impoverished as is currently the trend. Even our “public” school 
system in America has at its root the property taxes of the lands surrounding the 
school to provide material resources for the school. When those properties are 
poverty-struck, likewise the school is cash-strapped. While money does not 
automatically ensure quality of education and the absence of money does not 
automatically ensure deficiency in education, the two are largely correlated. Not-
for-profit organizations and charitable donation can only be expected to equalize 
the schools to the degree which these organizations and charities have clout; in 
their absence, inner-city and rural schools will continue to choke. 
The Achievability of the Great Community 
Dewey laid out the conditions required for the great community to be 
possible at all, as he called it, “the search for conditions under which the Great 
Society may become the Great Community.”146 Further, attaining these 
conditions may be inadequate, for “it is not claimed that the conditions which will 
be noted will suffice, bit only that at least they are indispensable.”147 In order to 
arrive at a community, however, Dewey first sought the conditions for the 
possibility of association. He saw a distinction between an association and a 
community, because a mere collection of individuals counted as an association 
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but more was needed for that to solidify into a community. To even become an 
association and not just an aggregate, there had to exist an arrangement and 
coordination of parts. Dewey stated that an organization is another word for an 
association, but regardless of which synonym we used, it was a group of 
individuals that had a rudimentary functional basis that came together in an 
organized manner. This could range from The American Philosophical 
Association to a local bowling league, and while these associated forms of living 
promoted the foundations of communal life, they did not quite attain the 
unification of community. Nevertheless, in order for a collection of individuals to 
become an association, there must be coordination and there is usually a 
function which defines why they come together. One of the most pressing 
functions that organizations can provide its members is protection, access to 
tools and medicines, but also companionship and the possibility for enduring 
bonds. It is unimportant as to whether these people are geographically 
contiguous or not, only that they come together in some manner and coordinate 
their actions. Dewey stated that “associated or joint activity is a condition of the 
creation of a community.”148 Therefore, the first condition for the attainment of 
community is organic association. 
The barest benefit of association was known to even early hominids. 
Associated living brings protection and freedom which an individual is incapable 
of having alone. As Dewey stated “individuals can find the security and protection 
that are prerequisites for freedom only in association with others— and then the 
organization these associations take on, as a measure of securing their 
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efficiency, limits the freedom of those who have entered into them.”149 
Association also comes with a cost: the individual must conform and adopt the 
values and practices of those around them for fear of being ostracized from the 
association. This conformity is not always something the individual is aware of; 
so thoroughly are they indoctrinated into the values and beliefs of those they 
associate with. Sometimes these must be adopted, as when an outsider joins the 
group and must learn its ways. While associated living brings a certain amount of 
freedom, it also takes away from freedom in another sense. The freedom granted 
by association is the liberation of potentialities that comes with coordinated living, 
while the freedom sacrificed is the ability to behave indiscriminately. Dewey went 
on to say that the only meaningful freedom is the ability to control conditions in 
order to bring about desired consequences, and while independent existence 
permits the greatest range of individual behavior, it doesn’t allow for the greatest 
range of control over conditions. Many of the most meaningful outcomes have as 
their prerequisite the cooperation and coordination of other individuals. 
Contemporary life shows many examples of this ranging from corporations, team 
sports, research groups, and book clubs to family life. All told, Dewey held the 
positive freedom gained from association far outweighed the indiscriminate 
freedom of rugged individualism for “no man and no mind was ever emancipated 
merely by being left alone.”150 The freedom granted by associated life in 
conjunction with the safety it offers is the second condition required to bring 
about a community. 
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The most direct route to controlling conditions, and thereby being free, is to 
possess knowledge of social means. Knowledge is a social capital; it is 
developed, passed on, distributed and clarified by way of social means such as 
language, education and conjoint research. Additionally, many researchers 
depend upon tools which are either developed or produced by others or 
otherwise are products of sociable living. Even if one had the know-how and 
ability to craft these tools, still the resources needed to produce them are a social 
capital. Steel is more than a metal dug whole-cloth from the earth; it must go 
through a process, itself the result of generations of social investigations, to 
become a product. So much of what contemporary life depends on is so indelibly 
social that its social nature has become transparent. The more advanced 
research has become, the more specialized the tools which permit that research 
to further have become as well, and therefore the more socially indebted it is. 
The third condition for the attainment of community is the possession and 
distribution of knowledge. In order for a community to flourish, this social 
knowledge must be distributed freely and inquiry must be encouraged not 
prevented.151 
Individuals are not just beholden to the values and beliefs of the 
associated life, but they are also expected to be held responsible, to the extent 
which they are capable, in forming and directing the activities of the group. 
Individuals who wish only to reap the benefits of associated living will never really 
be a part of a community because community life is a give and take. Individuals 
able to do more are expected to do more. The bright and charismatic should step 
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up to the role of leadership and guides, the courageous should defend and the 
careful should calculate. On the other side of this coin, the group should demand 
the liberation of the potentialities of its members in harmony with the interests 
and goods of the association. If individuals do not take part in directing the 
activities of the group, they are beholden to something which they are not really a 
part of, and if groups do not demand the furtherance of individual potentiality, 
they may never obtain their capacity to participate in said group. 
From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a 
responsible share according to capacity in forming and 
directing the activities of the group to which one belongs and 
in participating according to need in the values which the 
groups sustain.152 
Therefore, the fourth condition for community is the participation of its members 
in taking their responsible share according to capacity in the doings and 
sufferings of the community. 
Not all members of associations and communities share the same values, 
and often times this can lead to conflict and bloodshed. A collection of factions 
and cliques can only become a community if these various groups interact 
flexibly and fully. If membership in one group comes at the expense of other 
groups, or if the exploitation of other groups is the express purpose of one group, 
there can never exist a community of these parts. Effectively, these groups are 
either gearing up toward, or are already presently in, a state of war. Dewey uses 
the example of members of a robber-band to make this point: 
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A member of a robber band may express his powers in a 
way consonant with belonging to that group and be directed 
by the interest common to its members. But he does so only 
at the cost of repression of those of his potentialities which 
can be realized only through membership in other groups.153 
While participation within the band can continue freely, association with other 
groups is strained by way of the parasitic nature of the robber-band. The robber-
band cannot be an integrated aspect of a community insofar as they prey upon 
that very community. As long as one group benefits at the detriment of another, 
there can be no association, and therefore no community. Dewey states that 
group cohesion is necessary when he said: 
From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of 
the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the 
interests and goods which are common: since every 
individual is a member of many groups, this specification 
cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact 
flexibly and fully in connection with other groups.154 
The fifth condition for the attainment of community therefore stands as the 
smooth integration and cooperation of internal groups. 
One of the chief ways to bring about peaceful cooperation is by way of 
communication. Genuine shared interest is perhaps the most powerful glue that 
can hold a community together, and shared interest is only possible if the 
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interests can be conceptualized and communicated. The clearest form of shared 
interest is when each member has in mind the same consequences and utilizes 
the same modes of meaning to bring about those consequences. Even if 
individuals are speaking to one another, it does not mean they are 
communicating. Communication requires more than merely talking at one 
another, it requires talking to one another. Though it is impossible for the 
experience of events to be passed directly to other members of a community, it is 
possible for those events to be shared. This sharing comes by way of utilizing 
signs and symbols which stand as representations of the events or experiences. 
Only when there exist signs or symbols of activities and of 
their outcomes can the flux be viewed as from without, be 
arrested for consideration and esteem, and be regulated.155 
Dewey said “symbols in turn depend upon and promote communication,”156.the 
signs and symbols only act as communication when both parties have the same 
or very similar meaning for those signs. Emotions and beliefs make up the bulk of 
shared interest, but goals and outcomes play their role as well. Therefore, the 
sixth condition for a community is the maintenance of common signs and 
symbols which allow for robust communication of meaning between its members. 
These six conditions 1) trust from natural association 2) mutual benefit 3) the 
possession and distribution of social knowledge 4) the active participation of the 
members in the directing of the community 5) the full integration of individuals 
and 6) communication through shared signs and symbols stand as the 
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requirements to bring about a cohesive and free community. If any one of them is 
lacking, the result is a community striving to become, but existing still only at the 
level of an association. The benefits of a robust community can be felt by every 
member of that community, and whether individuals realize it or not the strongest 
drive among us is to belong. Belonging to an association is one thing, but 
belonging to a healthy community brings about individual fulfillment in ways no 
mere association can. Interestingly absent from these conditions is a numeric 
value of how many individuals are required to bring about the great community. 
Also absent are reference to material wealth; is it possible for just a few 
individuals suffering from abject poverty to have a democratic community that is 
flourishing? I leave this question for a future investigation. 
Achievability of Individualism within the Great Community 
Given that the conditions for the achievability of the great community are 
met, then this new individualism will not to be a boogeyman to be feared and 
hated, it will be something to be achieved. This new individualism has been a 
rarity in human history, usually deserving of mention in historic texts or 
celebrated for genius or development of science, industry or art. But its rarity is 
due to the conditions which bring it about being largely adrift and sporadic rather 
than stable and secured. Dewey argued that were these conditions secured an 
era of new individualism could flourish. This era could only be brought about by 
developing a community whose cultural institutions foster the growth and 
development of individuals, thus creating the environment in which more 
individuals could thrive than previously. In effect, Dewey was promoting a culture 
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which would free individuals rather than enslaving them to traditions which did 
not aid their natures in flourishing. 
There exist countries where only a select few, usually the wealthy and 
powerful, are given the opportunities to flourish, countries whose social fabric is 
constructed in such a manner that a small group of people make the decisions 
that affect a larger group of people without their consent or say will inevitably 
have to resort to an increasing police presence to enforce their will upon the 
unwilling. In effect, a small group of people are forcing the modifications of the 
environment upon a larger group of people who will undergo its effects and the 
consequences of these modifications. But if movement toward a police-state is 
not desired and increased cooperation is preferred then communication must be 
sought: 
For it is by activities that are shared by language and other 
means of intercourse that qualities and values become 
common to the experience of a group of mankind. Now art is 
the most effective mode of communication that exists.”157 
Art creates potentially common elements which exists in the possible 
transactions of human organisms with their environments and unites humanity in 
its shared possession in consciousness. It is through these possibilities that 
greater access and communicability occurs than any of the natural languages 
that exist because, 
[a]rt is a more universal mode of language than is the 
speech that exists in a multitude of mutually unintelligible 
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forms. The language of art has to be acquired. But the 
language of art is not affected by the accidents of history that 
mark off different modes of human speech.158 
Dewey believed that artistic expression served as the more universal method of 
communication. The truth of this statement is obvious to dictators and tyrants for 
they seek absolute control over art (often called propaganda in this context). Art 
easily moves emotions when words do not. Even though a specific work of art 
may not speak to a given individual, art surrounds us and is internalized by us; 
we are creatures of art as much as anything else. Furthermore if art has an 
impact on one of our fellow humans and that human in part makes up our cultural 
environment then indirectly art has affected our environment and our experience. 
Language, for all of its wonderful ability to transmit, still is imperfect in its 
communicability. While art itself is an imperfect medium of communication, it at 
least transcends many of the limitations of spoken and written language. Dewey 
stated that “[t]he difference between English, French and German speech create 
barriers that are submerged when art speaks.”159 People from vastly different 
cultural backgrounds can each be moved by a work of art, though they have no 
means of describing the experience to one another, for lack of a shared medium 
of expression, aside from more art. In this way art acts as a language, but only 
when 
language is taken in its widest sense, a sense wider than 
oral and written speech. It includes the latter. But it includes 
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also not only gesture but rites, ceremonies, monuments and 
the products of industrial and fine arts. A tool or machine, for 
example, is not simply a simple or complex physical object 
having its own physical properties and effects, but is also a 
mode of language. For it says something to those who 
understand it, about operation of use and their 
consequences.160 
The importance of this is often lost on contemporary philosophers who fixate on 
written or oral speech as the epitome of language. This is especially ironic when 
the written or spoken words fixated upon are displayed by way of a technology 
(such as a computer screen or even printed upon a sheet of paper) which is in 
effect a mode of language of its own, requiring an art to utilize. 
In one sense art is the heart of human experience; or rather it is a “quality 
that permeates an experience.”161 Aesthetic experience, that which humans 
share in common, regardless of linguistic cultural practices, is a unifying fabric of 
humanity. Membership in the great community would require communication on 
levels that language alone is incapable of delivering due to the vast diversity of 
languages utilized. If these barriers are to be overcome, it will only be by way of 
artistic communication and the cultivation of an aesthetic experience required for 
participating in this communication. 
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Dewey further believed that the most effective means for bringing about 
communication among individuals from radically different cultures was by way of 
art. 
[N]o matter what may be the case with the impulses and 
powers that lead the creative artist to do his work, works of 
art once brought into existence are the most compelling of 
the means of communication by which emotions are stirred 
and opinions formed.162 
It is by way of art that individuals can truly express their uniqueness, and 
communicate with others. But art has a wide range of inclusion for Dewey and is 
not limited to the “high arts” or the museum. Engineers can express their genius 
by way of crafting new machines, athletes can push themselves beyond the 
limitations of those who came before them, performers can stir emotion with new 
plays and musicians can craft new tempos. But even this does not capture the 
range of activities which Dewey believed the term “art” expressed, for game-
designers, poets and teachers are included within this concept. Any human 
activity which creates and communicates can be viewed as a work of art. 
Those individuals who would live in the great community would therefore 
not be limited to transmitting information with written or spoken language, 
because as Dewey stated “[w]e are beginning to realize that emotions and 
imagination are more potent in shaping public sentiment and opinion than 
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information and reason.”163 The most powerful and heartfelt communication is 
expressed with emotions and imagination, not with words. The Ancient Greeks 
knew this, and tragedy stood as a connective tissue for their culture accordingly. 
For this reason, if no other, art should be harnessed as a means of 
shaping sentiment and opinion toward educational, cultural and lifestyle 
modification which brings about greater freedom, democratic arrangement and 
individuality rather than the converse. An can be concluded that an advocate of 
rugged individualism, elitism and plutocratic social arrangement will thus see 
expressive art as their greatest foe and will attempt to curb its growth at every 
turn in order to protect their interests. 
It should be mentioned that art can just as easily be used as propaganda 
to inflame the passions and motivate many toward actions which harm 
themselves but benefit a shrewd few. Despots utilize art to convey their 
dominance for this reason; were art’s communicative power not so thorough, 
despots would not waste their time and effort in plastering their face across a 
nation’s surface. Art is therefore not panacea and in no way guarantees that its 
communicative ability promotes well-being. Though emotions communicate 
better and more fully than words, the intellect which shapes them may solely 
have personal interest in mind. Art can be harnessed to craft a feeling of 
solidarity and belongingness, something which many individuals desperately 
seek. 
The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century saw advances in the art of 
mechanization, and this is one of those examples of an art that did as much harm 
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as good. Though the machine age multiplied the power of human labor and 
allowed for the creation, transportation and distribution of goods never before 
seen, it also acted as a limiting condition for millions of individuals who were 
forced to labor in monotonous assembly lines due to socio-economic forces 
brought about largely by the introduction of machines into various industries. The 
unfulfilling labor was not the worst issue though, for during this time a new culture 
was forged and this culture has trapped individuals more thoroughly than wage-
slavery ever could have. The artifice which crafted the machines played just as 
acute of a role in forging a culture of passivity among those who were doomed to 
toil within the bowels of those machines, and this suffering has had 
consequences which reach even the twenty-first century. Even through the 
darkness of the industrial revolution, Dewey held there to a silver lining: 
The solution of the crisis in culture is identical with the 
recovery of composed, effective and creative individuality. 
The harmony of individual mind with the realities of a 
civilization made outwardly corporate by an industry based 
on technology does not signify that individual minds will be 
passively molded by existing social conditions as if the latter 
were fixed and static. When the patterns that form 
individuality of thought and desire are in line with actuating 
social forces, that individuality will be released for creative 
effort.164 
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The existence of mechanical and technological advancement can either trap 
humanity’s future or free it. Any tool can be used for harm or good; even the 
splitting of the atom can either be the most destructive weapon in humanities 
arsenal or the source of non-destructive energy. The tool itself represents no 
inherent evil, but the usage of it is determined as much by creative intelligence as 
it is by existing social conditions. 
Though the existing conditions today are largely utilized to benefit a small 
number of wealthy individuals, this does not mean they are destined, doomed or 
necessarily committed. A shift in cultural practices could result in tumultuous 
change on par with the French Revolution, and upend the differences in a short 
period of time, but even this would not take root unless the change were one of 
habit and not merely outward condition. Conditions can change, but the ties that 
bind are behavioral practices passed from one generation to the next. 
The cultural practice of dividing labor into “civilized” and “toil” must 
radically change in order for progress to occur. Dewey stated that: 
The question of the relation of man and nature, of mind and 
matter, assumes its vital significance in this context. A 
‘humanism’ that separates man from nature will envisage a 
radically different solution of the industrial and economic 
perplexities of the age than the humanism entertained by 
those who find no uncrossable gulf or fixed gap. The former 
will inevitably look backward for direction; it will strive for a 
cultivated elite supported on the backs of toiling masses. 
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The latter will have to face the question of whether work 
itself can become an instrument of culture and of how the 
masses can share freely in a life enriched in imagination and 
esthetic enjoyment.”165 
Only when education has become an instrument for cultivating inquirers and 
artisans rather than automatons and meek acceptance of leadership will culture 
be humane. Our current conception of schools is likely to be radically different 
were Dewey’s advice followed. In an article published in the New York Times 
titled “Dewey’s Outline for a Utopian School,” Dewey depicted what educational 
life looks like in a “Utopian” society.166 There is no calcified institution known as 
“school” for the Utopians, and instead the younger generation consorts with older 
generations in directed manners. Their education is the transaction they receive 
in wider society, which due to its democratic fabric, is educative in nature. What 
Dewey never dealt with was what further social inquiries would be required once 
the conditions for the great community were met. Given that these conditions are 
all but out of reach to contemporary society, the question remains: were they 
obtained then would social inquiries still be required? If a community had 
established trust among its members, open lines of communication, shared 
benefit and mutual protection for those who participated and utilized the most 
advanced social inquiries available, would this not be a community which had 
achieved harmony? Even this community would face the unknown, for life is full 
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of uncertainty, unrest and change. The utilization of social inquiry to diagnose, 
evaluate, hypothesize and experiment would never cease in the great 
community, and these inquiries would be the elixir by which the democratic 
culture would stay young. Rather than looking backward to bygone times for 
solutions in tradition, a culture that solves its problems by controlled social inquiry 
would have a mechanism for overcoming those problems it faced. I end with one 
final quote from Dewey: 
Democracy will come into its own, for democracy is a name 
for a life of free and enriching communion. It had its seer in 
Walt Whitman. It will have its consummation when free 
social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and 
moving communication.167 
We have yet to arrive at a full and moving communication due to a variety of 
problems, but if free social inquiry is utilized in finding the solution to these 
problems and embraced, then a democratic lifestyle is a possibility within the 
grasp of human communities, thus allowing for the formation of a great 
community. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Upon reflecting about Dewey’s theory of the great community, one is 
struck most by how utterly it has failed to materialize. This post-script will explore 
this by delving into a historical look at the eclipse of the pragmatism movement in 
philosophy, the waning of Dewey’s influence upon the practice of education, an 
examination of contemporary problems in light of Dewey’s suggestions and 
current movements in globalization, especially in relation to meaningful prospects 
of sustainable peace. 
In a 1928 article in Time magazine, Count Hermann Keyserling was 
quoted as stating: "the two contributions of America to world culture are 
Professor Dewey and Negro jazz."168 Likewise in the same article it was reported 
that: 
Dr. Fai, acting as Rector of the National University at Peking, 
was presenting an honorary Ph.D. degree to John Dewey. 
"We honor you," said Dr. Fai, "as the Second Confucius."169 
However in 1958, just six years after Dewey’s death in 1952, a Time magazine 
article noted the following: 
                                                 
168 Time Magazine, June 4, 1928, Cover story. See the following link: 
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19280604,00.html 
 
169 Ibid. 
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The Deweyites thus transformed conditioning techniques 
into ends in themselves. Teachers' colleges assumed the 
dignity of lamaseries. Teachers were denied the chance of 
learning more about their subjects, in favor of compulsory 
education courses in how to teach them ... But their 
exclusive devotion to techniques and group adjustment 
should never again be allowed to hide the fact that American 
education exists first of all to educate the individual in a body 
of learning, with a tradition and purpose behind it.170 
While some innovations were hailed, the overall criticism of Dewey’s influence is 
notable. How can sentiments vary this widely in thirty years? Dewey’s 
contribution to American education was seriously questioned. But this raises a 
further question, if pragmatism can be seen as a creative response to Emerson’s 
clarion call in his 1837 Phi-Beta-Kappa address titled “The American Scholar,” 
why was this native philosophy to America no longer trusted in certain circles? To 
understand the negative criticism of pragmatism, namely the failure to appreciate 
the importance of the movement called pragmatism, one must bear in mind 
Dewey’s special role and contribution in the development of pragmatism. 
The Growth of Pragmatism 
While Charles Sanders Peirce coined the phrase “pragmatism” and 
William James popularized it, Dewey played his part by more carefully 
                                                 
170 Time Magazine, “Education: The Long Shadow of John Dewey.” Monday, Mar. 31, 
1958. See the following link: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,937554-2,00.html 
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elaborating the philosophical stance on this concept by attempting to eliminate 
dualisms and argue for the continuity of experience. While Peirce and James 
were both rigorous scientific minds, each of them maintained some variation of 
the Christian faith. Dewey, however, broke from this faith as he turned away from 
absolutism in favor of a thorough-going naturalism. As he worked through the 
implications of a naturalistic perspective, he turned his attention away from 
epistemological issues, which had plagued even the early stages of pragmatism. 
Instead Dewey came to focus on issues of community and scientific 
understandings of the world even more so than those who had come before him. 
It should be noted that from pragmatism’s earliest formation, the idea of 
community was of central importance. Peirce discussed community in the limited 
context of formation of belief: 
The man who adopts [the method of tenacity] will find that 
other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to 
occur to him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are 
quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence 
in his belief. This conception, that another man's thought or 
sentiment may be equivalent to one's own, is a distinctly new 
step, and a highly important one. It arises from an impulse 
too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger of 
destroying the human species. Unless we make ourselves 
hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other's opinions; 
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so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the 
individual merely, but in the community.171 
Peirce here declares that the thoughts of others weigh heavily upon us all. He 
further held that the community of scientists was an exemplar of how the social 
aspect of belief formation can serve the quest for truth. We are not silos of 
thought, or islands adrift; we exist within a social matrix which always includes 
the thoughts of others. For Peirce our earliest thoughts are likely little more than 
imitations of those of our teachers and parents. Hence the only way to avoid 
coming into conflict with others is to live alone. 
By expanding upon Royce’s conception of the great community in light of 
Peirce’s faith in the scientific community, Dewey was able to excise Royce’s 
focus on a religious community. Instead, Dewey steered pragmatic philosophy 
into the realm of culture and practice, and focused on concepts such as social 
injustice, educational deficiencies and political power. This shift of focus marks 
off Dewey’s particular contribution, but it also demarcates a point of departure 
from his contemporaries. Perhaps Dewey’s most significant departure was 
embodied in the founding of his Laboratory School in Chicago and his pioneering 
research in pedagogy. 
Dewey’s Influence in Educational Theory 
To echo a previous statement, one of the most perplexing aspects of 
Dewey’s influence on educational theory is noting the abject lack of it in a 
contemporary setting. To this day, those teaching future educators quote Dewey 
                                                 
171 Peirce, Charles “The Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (November 
1877). Parenthetical addition mine. 
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avidly, yet the techniques, methods, findings and habitudes he developed find no 
appeal in most contemporary Educational Colleges. Many contemporary 
educators continue to utilize lecture as their primary method of transmitting 
information, even when the very information they are transmitting regards the 
inherent limitations, problems and short-comings of lecture when compared to 
discussion, seminar style learning and other aspects of Dewey’s educational 
theory. Dewey’s pedagogies are praised but only rarely acted upon. 
Dewey’s main principles to reform education may be quoted as follows 
from his 1927 Child and Curriculum: 
1) What can be done, and how can it be done, to bring the 
school into closer relation with the home and neighborhood 
life – instead of having the school a place where the child 
comes solely to learn certain lessons?... 
2) What can be done in the way of introducing subject-matter 
in history and science and art, that shall have a positive 
value and real significance in the child’s own life; that shall 
represent, even to the youngest children, something worthy 
of attainment in skill or knowledge, as much so to the little 
pupil as are the studies of high-school or college student to 
him? … 
3) How can instruction in these formal, symbolic branches – 
the mastering of the ability to read, write and use figures 
intelligently – be carried on with everyday experience and 
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occupation as their background and in definite relations to 
other students of more inherent content, and be carried on in 
such a way that the child shall feel their necessity through 
their connection with subjects which appeal to him on their 
own accord?...172 
It can be readily seen that Dewey’s school aimed at uniting the experience of the 
child at home with that of the child at school. The habits and skills needed by a 
child to navigate and integrate themselves into their life-space would be the 
animating forces behind the learning of subject-matter and the arts. 
In attempting to find ways that school could more seamlessly integrate the 
child into a sense of community involvement, the child was being inculcated with 
the habits of participation so that when adulthood came, they would be well 
acquainted with the rhythm and hum of adult activity, Utilizing skills and 
techniques which would be of use in the household such as sewing and 
carpentry allowed the child to more mutually benefit the household. Through 
active learning of the system of patterns and symbols utilized in written 
communication and mathematics, the child could more competently take part in 
the transmission of ideas. 
As mentioned in chapter four, schooling that is focused on training rather 
than the development of the individual forms habits of passivity and 
acquiescence to authority. While individuals in position of power may wish to 
maintain a citizenry that is meek and obedient would thereby seek to maintain a 
                                                 
172 Dewey, John. The School and Society and The Child and Curriculum: An Expanded 
Edition, the University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 166-168. Portions omitted for space. 
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training regimen. Utilizing training is not in the interests of the individuals who 
seek to fulfill their full potential. In effect, as Dewey repeatedly stated, the then 
contemporary educational system actively thwarted three of the most important 
conditions to be met for the promotion of the great community: 1) the utilization of 
inquiry to solve problems, 2) the participation of the members and 3) the seeking 
of full potentiality of the members. The first condition of the utilization of inquiry is 
thwarted because members are taught to rely upon authority rather than the 
exercise and the findings of inquiry. The second condition of participation is 
thwarted because individuals are taught passivity rather than activity. Finally the 
third condition of the full potentiality of the members is thwarted because 
memorization of material does not cultivate or utilize critical thinking and thus 
does not further their growth. The then contemporary education system had 
focused on rote memorization and recitation of concrete information rather than 
the integration and utilization of the habits required to put this information to use. 
Contemporary Problems and their Solvability 
In chapter six, six conditions were discussed as necessary to the further 
attainment of the great community. What was left from this discussion was not 
just what was required but whether those requirements are possible themselves. 
I am unaware of any society that has managed to secure and promote all of the 
conditions, though pockets of individuals exist that have attained this or that 
condition. For example there still exist neighborhoods where the families trust 
and know one another well enough and each benefit from one another’s 
presence and work. But do they promote the achievement of the full intellectual 
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potential of their entire community? Do they possess and share the results of 
social inquires? And while members of scientific communities may share signs 
and symbols as well as the results of their inquiries, do they have the full 
participation of their members in guiding their community? 
A tension is seen within Dewey’s thinking, for while personal growth is the 
ideal of education, without the attainment of stabilization of the six conditions, 
continued growth is unattainable. Said differently, a point of sufficiently stable 
patterns are indispensable to the attainability of the great community. These 
stabilizing patterns can, and should, act as guiding principles of education. Were 
these conditions obtained, maintenance of them should be of utmost priority 
thereby directing growth to furtherance and continued upkeep of the great 
community. Until such time as all conditions are met, education should be geared 
toward the achievement of them, thereby standing as a specific, even final, end-
in-view to be obtained. 
No culture has been worked out which can claim to have attained all six 
conditions: 1) trust among community members, 2) mutual benefit for all 
community members, 3) possession and distribution of social knowledge among 
community members, 4) the active participation of community members, 5) 
achievement of the full potentiality of individuals within the community and 6) 
communication by utilization of shared signs and symbols. Either Dewey’s theory 
is unattainable or the conditions have merely not yet been met. It is my 
contention that because examples exist for each of the individual conditions, 
each in turn is proved possible. The attainment of all six conjointly merely stands 
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as a cultural project as yet unfinished. Why does the attainment of all six 
continue to elude humanity? 
Dewey’s own answer to this problem is that the social forces operating as 
blockages of the attainment of the great community come in two forms: the first 
form of blockage are the pecuniary interests of the wealthiest portion of society 
which operate to protect their wealth and power: “Armies and navies exist to 
protect commerce, to make secure the control of raw materials, and to command 
markets. Men would not sacrifice their lives for the purpose of securing economic 
gain for a few if the conditions presented themselves to their minds in this bald 
fashion.”173 Currently the interests of the wealthiest are protected with the blood 
and sweat of the poorest. Education, politics and industry have been steered to 
maintain the status quo, thus benefiting those currently in power. 
The second form of blockage are those spiritual teachings beholden to an 
alien culture that largely no longer applies to contemporary conditions: “one of 
the main difficulties in understanding the present and apprehending its human 
possibilities is the persistence of stereotypes of spiritual life which are formed in 
old and alien cultures.”174 Past societies acquiesced to spiritual teachings formed 
in a distant land where communities were “local; they did not merge, overlap and 
interact in all kinds of subtle and hidden ways.”175 Contemporary life lacks 
“patterns sufficiently enduring to provide anything stable in which to acquiesce, 
                                                 
173 Dewey, John. Individualism Old and New, p.31. 
 
174 Dewey, John. Individualism Old and New, p. 72. 
 
175 Ibid, p. 73. 
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and there is no material out of which to frame final and all-inclusive ends.”176 Until 
such time as the six conditions for the great community are secured, 
contemporary life will continue to lack the stability required to frame these ends, 
for the attainment of the conditions constitutes them as ends-in-themselves. 
Insofar as individuals and communities continue to cling to superstition and 
magical modes of thinking, especially as found in calcified modes of 
fundamentalist religious activity, these ends remain out of reach. 
The primary reason these ends remain unattainable in these settings is 
the turning away from social inquiry in favor of superstition and tradition; rather 
than seeking answers to problems, people recourse to intuition or tradition for 
answers. This is manifested as a continued resistance to universal public 
education by religious organizations and skepticism about the results of scientific 
inquiry, as relates to global climactic shifts and other pressing matters. 
Sustainable Peace and Globalization 
The League of Nations was founded in 1918 as a result of the Treaty of 
Versailles, and came at the conclusion of World War I. The nations involved in 
drafting the document, and in turn forming the League, had as their primary 
interest the prevention of future wars and the settling of international disputes. 
From its inception it lacked the full cooperation of its member states because 
taking part in the activities of the league were not always of primary benefit to the 
individual states. Thus while it was formed to prevent wars, it depended upon the 
cooperation of its member states, especially its most powerful members, to 
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enforce its regulations and sanctions. America did not participate in the League 
due to its having voted against the signing of the treatise. 
When World War II broke out in 1939, it became exceedingly clear that the 
League of Nations could not carry out the charge it had been given, namely to 
prevent world wars. At the conclusion of World War II, in 1945, another 
institution, the United Nations, was formed in an attempt to prevent a third World 
War. The question then arises: does the United Nations qualify as the way to 
establish the great community? One principle of the great community is that 
conflicts are resolved through social inquiry rather than violence, so if the United 
Nations were to qualify as the framework for the great community, it should 
prevent future wars. Twenty-six current wars constitute evidence that the United 
Nations is unable to meet its charge. The section that follows will explore whether 
the United Nations can in fact meet the conditions for the attainability of the great 
community. 
The first condition for the attainment of the great community is trust of its 
individual members. Here the individuals are not unique biological organisms but 
states that do not trust each other. The second condition is the mutual benefit of 
all members. While it is not common practice, some nations take actions which 
do benefit only other nations; the more common rule is for nations to only benefit 
themselves so it is an open question whether there is common and mutual 
benefit to be had from membership in the United Nations. The third condition is 
the possession and distribution of social knowledge among the members. Here 
the United Nations fulfills the condition as international inquiries are pursued and 
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widely published. But this condition is being circumvented by the occasional use 
of power and influence to prevent inquiries from moving forward. The fourth 
condition is active participation of the members and while the United Nations has 
many member states, not all of them guide the decisions of the United Nations. 
Powerful states like Russia, China and the United States play a far larger role in 
determining U.N. policy than Albania or Gabon. In this way the U.N. acts as a 
magnification of social issues inherent within these powerful nations rather than 
as a solution. The fifth condition is the achievement of the full potentiality of 
individuals. While membership within the U.N. pays dividends to the powerful 
nations and ancillary benefits to the less powerful nations, it does not seek the 
full cultivation of the communities that comprise those nations. This is 
characterized most by continued poverty and strife felt by member nations that 
could easily be alleviated by efforts on behalf of the powerful nations. Their 
continued ignorance or apathy toward these conditions can only be viewed as a 
lack of interest in the full potentiality of their members. The final condition of 
communication by utilization of shared signs and symbols is the most difficult to 
gauge. While words are translated between member nations in order to 
accurately convey meaning, subterfuge and political posturing color these 
meanings with layers of interpretation, thus clouding whether or not signs are 
being utilized in a shared manner. 
In summary, of the six conditions that Dewey stated as necessary for the 
attainability of the great community, the United Nations comes close to meeting a 
single condition but is a great distance from the other five. If Dewey’s conditions 
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accurately represent those principles needed for the formation of a stable 
community of peace, then the United Nations was not designed to meet the 
overwhelming majority of the conditions needed. 
Conclusions 
The blockages to meeting the conditions for attaining the great community 
are powerful and entrenched. The leaders in power who control and direct 
political processes perhaps believe that allowing these blockages to erode would 
undermine their various positions within the community. Perhaps there is some 
truth in this, as a community oriented toward full participation of its members 
wielding the results of social inquiry would have no need of demagogues and 
messiahs. There are no such communities which meet all of the conditions laid 
out by Dewey. The attainment of these conditions appears dubious as long as 
power politics continue and organizations prevent educational institutions from 
flourishing. Communities exist, and perhaps even nations, which have attained 
one or more of the conditions; a fact to which Dewey was aware. But Dewey was 
skeptical of the emergence of a community attaining all six anytime in the near 
future. Dewey’s suggestions were not utopian in character, each one is 
attainable, and has been attained to some degree by individuals and 
communities. Nevertheless the emergence of the great community will continue 
to be a cultural project yet to be attained for many years, perhaps centuries, to 
come. 
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